Let us not forget that the success of the JFH embarkations was done with a legacy of supervision and, in the main, in fairly benign conditions. The 'pitch up and make it work' technique only really works if you have a 'socket' into which to 'plug' and without significant investment in embarked time the socket is impossible to create.
Exam question. Which JFH senior officers could truly supervise deck ops/ Answer - two or three.
Let us also be clear about one thing. The pilot hands/ eyes/ controls in whatever sea state and whatever emcon state and in whatever NBCD condition are fairly straight forward. What 'certain people' have to get their heads around is that the aircrew are at times a training audience (as has been described) and at times a training tool. If the TAG leaves with the requisite number of bounces to call itself current - but not all the armourers loaded weapons in a swell, not all the freddies checked people in and out through 'force marshal' and not all the air traffickers conducted a four ball CCA - well the system has failed. Full stop.
This is what the JFH embarkation cycle did not achieve - and even at the end of the Harrier life (for example) we had never exercised bomb prep for a surge op using PW4...so didn't know if our assumptions would in any way hold up.
Producing OC from Maritime aviation is about creating a full-up system of systems amongst which the pilot him or herself is almost irrelevant - and which requires the TAG to be embarked for extended periods, over and above when the pilots feel comfortable.
And yes I are one, and yes I have 'a modicum' of experience.