Around 3 years ago I presented myself for a screening with Turkish.
The interview was novel, myself & another candidate (only two of us showed up that day) were sat around a big table, drinking tea, with around half a dozen fleet managers/chief pilot/ops director or whomever was in town that day & fancied a cup of chai.
Very convivial, but what struck us was that of all the management wallas present, only 1 spoke English confidently enough to ask any questions, all the others passed through him. This lack of English skills among the senior pilot mangement is undoubtedly reflected in English Level4 being a tick in a box rather than a REAL requirement.
The sim "test", was notable for the total lack of any need to display CRM/use checklists/ follow procedures. Just get in, take off, have an engine failure, turn downwind & shut down the engine yourself downwind on a visual circuit, never mind that engine flmeout is not a Recall item ( the other guy is only there so you have someone to talk to when you are feeling bored
) checklists? Nah real pilots don't need them.
The whole thing was quite a ride & was conducted by 3 of them, jibbering away excitedly behind us in the instructors station. I was told by previous candidates that post-Hudson (but pre AMS ) the favourite laugh was double eng failure, land in the bosphorus, they had dropped that when I attended post AMS, strangely they didn't give me stall recovery in the approach configuration nor auto-throttle failure
I was genuinely quite shocked that this little "intro" might be in fact a heads-up as to how they operated, & wasn't quite sure by the end of it if I really wanted to find out. I wasn't offered the job anyhow, having made the fatal error of asking if the 737 roster would accomodate commuting (it wouldn't , & it seems you weren't meant to ask ) but I did end up working for another Turkish company subsequently.
Some of the stuff I saw there both in the Sim, & whilst line training,in particular the First Officers total unwillingness to point out anything that might offend you/ call into question your performance as a Capt, went a long way to aiding my understanding of the AMS accident.
Big, big cultural problems for aviation in that country,speaking up against your "seniors" just doesn't happen in general life & most of the older generation pilots are ex military & very "old school", resulting in a cockpit gradient that is much too steep to permit speaking up in many cases, regardless of the age/experience in the RHS. The full report of the AMS accident suggested the PIC was not of this mentality at all, & was respected & liked for his fair attitude, but. . . no matter how fair he was, how able did the other two guys feel to intervene / go over his perceived position/authority.
The attitude between pilot managers/office staff, and between Turkish pilots /cabin crew seemed strangely "sixties", to an outsider. If you need further evidence of this paternal/hierarchy attitude that pervades their society, look at the social problems relating to Turkish women, their choice of partners, & the family "reaction".
Would be difficult to argue that ingrained safety problems do not exist in Turkish, the only frightening thing being that many of the same observations could be levelled at countless other carriers (as many of us have seen first hand )
Doubt if any credence will be given to this by anyone who could make a difference, as the Turkish CAA / Turkish Airlines guys will all have flown in the same squadron & will perpetrate the status quo.