Management of Risk
A bit late in the day but thought that I would make an observation!
Apparently neither pilot was trained in high altitude flight. If that was the case they would not have practiced stall recovery in that regime. Neither is is logical that when pilots spend 60+% of their flying in this environment such an omission is tolerated.
Safety in aviation is usually calculated reference to the risk ratio of 1 in 10 to the -6 or 10 to the -7 depending on the critical nature of the system under consideration. The reliability of the airspeed sensors would come into this consideration i.e. the likelihood of failure is extremely remote. This all changes when such an event occurs. This was apparently the case with the A300 where such previous failures had occurred and a "fix" was in the pipeline.
While it would not be reasonable to stop all operations while "the fix" was being manufactured and incorporated, it would be more than reasonable to join the dots and realise that the reduction in risk should be ameliorated. In this case by highlighting the situation to the crews and by providing additional training to recognise and deal with the problem itself and the possible outcomes. In my view this is not "the benefit of hindsight" it is what management of safety and risk is all about.