It used to be called airmanship and common sense.....
If the accidents that you quoted are the ones that you are personally reminded of, then it is time for you to retire, old boy! You shouldn't be in the industry!
My bolds and brackets.....
"In addition to the regulatory oversight by TC, Cougar Helicopters is subject to a considerable amount of oversight by the companies that it has contractual obligations with. The oil companies independently bring in aviation and safety management specialists to periodically audit Cougar Helicopters.
Between 2007 and the date of the occurrence (March 2009), Cougar Helicopters had been subject to 16 external audits........"
"Finally, Cougar Helicopters has its own internal audit processes defined in its SMS. Typically there are
four separate internal audits performed each year on each Cougar Helicopters' base of operations. Additional audits or change management processes are completed as necessary when modifications have been made to the operational scope, which could include such things as opening a new base or the addition of a new helicopter.
Between 2007 and the date of the occurrence (March 2009), Cougar Helicopters performed 16 internal safety audits."
And later......
"In some extreme situations,
pilots may find themselves required to make a decision that goes against the formally established procedure because of some type of extenuating circumstance like weather, darkness, or sea state. If a pilot determines that the risk of ditching is so high that prolonging flight is considered a safer option, careful consideration must be given to the flight profile chosen to reach a safe landing spot. While there is no universally accepted flight profile for prolonging flight with a suspected gearbox malfunction, the investigation determined that many helicopter pilots would opt for a "low" and "slow" profile.
It is generally accepted that an altitude of 50 to 200 feet agl and an airspeed between 50 and 80 knots (i.e., at or near the bucket airspeed) reduces stresses on a compromised gearbox while still allowing for a rapid controlled ditch at the first indication of an impending gearbox failure.92
In Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) occurrence 85-H54001, the pilot of a S-61N lost all the MGB oil while only 17 nm offshore. Recognizing the potential for a MGB failure due to a lack of lubrication, the pilot established the helicopter at 100 feet above the water and 100 knots to keep the helicopter in a position from which it could be rapidly ditched if the situation worsened. When unusual noises and vibrations were experienced, the pilot turned into wind, flared to reduce the helicopter's speed and altitude, and carried out a successful ditching from which everyone survived."