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Old 7th Jan 2011, 02:26
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Propjet88
 
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Oz
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Dear Colleagues,

I must say that it is pleasant to see a thread where relevant issues are discussed constructively and politely. This is indeed rare in discussions associated with MPL where emotion and passion (for and against) are rampant!

Just to develop the discussion a little, from the thread to date, primacy (in relation to pilot training at least) can perhaps be considered simplistically under two broad areas - manipulative skills and decision making.
The IATA statement regarding excessive training on single engine aircraft being counterproductive is perhaps more associated with handling skills but it is worth considering that not only are light aircraft handing skills being embedded but so too are aeronautical decision making skills and the thread is now moving this way.

I’d suggest that aeronautical decision making is really all about risk management and in risk management context is all important. Perhaps then the issue for early training is not one of single engine aircraft per se, but at least equally importantly one of single pilot decision making.

AvMed.In brought up NDM as relevant and Alf has expanded on that. NDM is about decision making “in context”. Zsambok defines NDM as:

“...how experienced people, working as individuals or groups in dynamic, uncertain, and often fast paced environments, identify and assess their situation, make decisions and take actions whose consequences are meaningful to them and to the larger organisation in which they operate.

Elliott sums this up as

“...how people use experience to make decisions under time pressure, with unclear or changing conditions, degraded information and within team interactions...”

So, perhaps learning to make decisions solo is not the best way to learn to make decisions in a team environment?

The various references that Alf cites discuss the issues in depth but for the sake of this thread, here is a simplified decision making process proposed by Kepner and Tregoe which is intuitively attractive and goes along the following lines:

Analyse the Problem
• Problems are deviations from agreed / defined performance standards
• Problem must be accurately identified
• Problems are recognised by some change from a distinctive feature
• Causes to problems can be deduced from relevant changes found in analyzing the problem
• The most likely cause to a problem is the one that exactly explains all the facts
Decision Making
• Objectives must first be established
• Objectives must be classified and placed in order of importance
• Alternative strategies / options must be developed
• The options must be evaluated against all the objectives
• The option that is best able to achieve all the objectives is the tentative decision
• The tentative decision is evaluated for more possible consequences ?
• The decision is enacted together with any additional actions necessary to prevent any adverse consequences.
Kepner, C.,H., & Tregoe, B.,B., (1965). The Rational Manager: A Systematic Approach to Problem Solving and Decision-Making. McGraw-Hill, New York.

I find this model quite useful to stimulate discussion in CRM training as it is the understanding of this basic process that underpins the various decision making models such as “CLEAR”, “GRADE”, “DECIDE” etc that are often taught as “rote methods” for decision making. As Alf says, teaching the underlying principles, as opposed to just the specifics, is important.

However, this process and the “rote” models that fall from it do not consider many of the variables mentioned previously under NDM. Just taking the example of time, if time is limited, which bit(s) of the rote process, if any, could or should be skipped or abbreviated? It may be also worth considering the effect of the “fear factor” as a variable which may or may not influence quality of this process when the ultimate “adverse consequence” of a poor decision may be a disaster.

Those of us who have experience of operating in the multi – crew world will inevitably have come across the decision making “one man band” i.e. the pilot who seems to be unable to operate within the synergistic benefits of a crew. I wonder if this may reflect that they have become a little too “expert” in single – pilot decision making due to patterns formed by previous experience?
Best wishes
PJ88
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