Simple Staffing Questions
Caz,
As someone in the know, and whilst you are "in the mood" to talk about how HQ 1 Gp and HQSTC "staffed" the BoI in the remarkably short time between 3 March and 3 April 1995 perhaps you could also answer the following points:
Neither the BoI nor either of the Stn Cdrs mention the word negligence, but the two senior reviewing officers do, and, clearly therefore, this "concept" must have been developed during the staffing process at 1 Gp. Since both Air Marshals have always made it clear that they saw themselves as part of BoI "process" then the rules of AP 3207 also applied to them. I do not propose to go back over the old ground of how a "degree of speculation" fits with the "no doubt whatsover" rule - that "process" anomaly in the AOCinC's comments is well known and has never been answered satisfactorily. However, the then extant AP 3207 6th Edition March 1993 at Annex G to Chapter 8 requires at paragraph 7 that:
Where a person fails, whether negligent or not, the board should consider the possible human failings of others who placed that person in the situation.
How did the staff at HQ1 Gp meet this requirement - especially given that others were clearly involved in the decision to use a Mk2 against the advice and request of the Detachment Commander, and yet others, many very senior, were involved in the decision to operate the aircraft at all against the recommendations of Boscombe Down. Who, for example, made the decision to allocate ZD 576 to Aldergrove, and what consideration did he give to the known issues with its serviceability - ZD 576, on 25 May, having suffered the last "in-service" incident that led to Boscombe Down stopping its trials. A review of "airworthiness", a word which does not figure anywhere in the BoI, should surely have been a staffing consideration given the status of CA's recommendations and the RTS, let alone all the other known problems with the aircraft?
Or are my suspicions that the policy of allocating blame, dictated from on high, meant that nobody in either 1Gp or HQSTC's engineering staffs did any sort of review at all with everyone quite "content" to continue down the road of blaming the pilots - exactly as the BoI had set out (or been directed?) to do with its confirmation that:
[The BoI made] its early decision to “eliminate as possible causes: major technical malfunction or structural failure of the aircraft prior to impact” and to focus “on the crew’s handling and operation of the aircraft” ?
However, of course, despite this decision we know that the main BoI, even with its many flaws, did not find sufficient evidence to allocate human failings let alone negligence to the pilots!
Again if I am incorrect please put me right, and tell me what staffing the engineering and airworthiness areas received in 1 Gp.
As a second question, to which I guess you must know the answer - when did HQ 1 Gp approach DLS for their confirmation that the Gross Negligence verdict was "lawful" and in accordance with the rules? Since HQ 1 Gp introduced the negligence concept one has to assume that they took this action, which was required by the AOCinC's memo of Febuary 1995 and was confirmed as having taken place to the HofL Inquiry? Between 3 March 1995 and 3 April 1995 there were only some 21 working days - a remarkably short time to get a potentially complex legal response and complete all the other staffing processes involved if this was only being done for the first time.
I look forward to your response to these simple and straight-forward questions.
JB