John Purdey
My opinion is that the responsibility you mention remains with the crew so long as the airworthiness chain is intact. There may be other aspects aircrew would raise but that is my take as someone holding airworthiness delegation. The notion that the buck stops with them does not hold water if this Duty of Care requirement is not met. It was not. In such cases, blame may be shared, but it cannot be placed solely on the crew.
The RAF hierarchy had a higher responsibility to ensure they had an aircraft that was demonstrably suitable for the task. MoD have provided evidence it was not. That evidence should be sufficient to introduce even more doubt. Greater minds than mine agree.
As I have always said, the crew may have erred, but no-one knows for certain. But the MoD hierarchy most definitely erred to a greater degree, between November 1993 (ACAS signing the RTS) and 2nd June 1994. As I have also said, Haddon-Cave QC expressed this learned opinion and named and shamed, for far lesser offences - MoD and Ministers agreed with him.
What did the Nimrod Review say was the root cause? The ethos that safety could be set aside for financial gain/savings. Was this the case prior to ACAS signing the Chinook RTS? Yes. Did he know? I don't know but he must be an ostrich if he didn't. Did the RAF know and were they warned? Yes. What did the RAF Chief Engineer do about the raft of airworthiness failures noted in the various inquiries? S.F.A. Had the lessons from ZD576 been learned, perhaps other accidents and deaths could have been prevented.
I do hope those involved at the time (1987-94) in AMSO, AML and MoD(PE) are interviewed by Lord Philip. They should be given the opportunity to explain. Unfortunately, that luxury is denied the crew who, I am sure, would have been appalled to know their aircraft had been declared "dangerous" and unairworthy by Boscombe Down. Had they survived, their defence would have been very robust.