Periodic reports by DMO detailing 'Projects of Concern' are quite worthless unless positive leadership is shown by politicians in holding to account high-ranking Defence bureaucrats and military officers who have been complicit in the origination and management of flawed hardware acquisition strategies.
The question 'Why no helo transport?' relates directly to support of defence industry being the central plank of Australian defence policy in lieu of adequate and credible combat readiness being continuously maintained. Had combat-proven in-service helicopter types been progressively optimized through manufacturer programs instead of hugely costly projects (Seasprite, Tiger, MRH90) being generated to materially benefit the major international arms peddlers who now largely parent Australian defence industry, the ADF would now have more cost-effective operational capacity.
Perhaps $5billion has hitherto been squandered on flawed helo projects but the architects are not being held accountable, whether they be the Defence executives who generated the acquisition strategies (like Projects Air 87 and Air 9000) and/or those within the Helicopter Systems Division of DMO responsible for project co-ordination and management.
Digressing a tad, the goal of creating 'a hardened and networked Army' as the central core of a mythical ADF Force 2030 structure is also questionable as who can predict how military engagements might be conducted 2 decades hence? Do our defence planners envisage the ADF playing Rommel across northern Australia or in other arid areas of the world rather than being more adequately equipped for operations in our regional wet tropics archipelago?
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 29th Nov 2010 at 01:32.