Is that the complete final report? I searched the NTSB site for a more comprehensive document but could find one.
Looks like too much emphasis on the windscreen to me. The ECL movement was not caused by the bird entering the cockpit, but by the force of impact being transmitted through the structure. By their own admission, the same thing happened to another 76C+ with a standard laminated windscreen, albeit only one ECL was dislodged. I know of the same thing happening to another type with switches rather than ECLs, and again only one was dislodged. I do accept that the disruption of the windscreen and subsequent wind rush would be disorientating and would have affected the crew's response, but it didn't materially cause the power loss.
So, maybe more attention should have been focused on the throttle quadrant design, and wear and tear tolerances?
I'm also very intrigued by the suggestion that the crew had 6 seconds to react before the Nr became unrecoverable. All you S-76 pilots who have done autorotations just sit and imagine - pull the ECLs then start counting, one thousand, two thousand, three thousand.....6 seconds is an eternity and I can't imagine where the Nr would be after it.
The report mentions the CVR, was an FDR fitted? If so, it would have been useful to know what pilot intervention actually took place and at what point. i.e. how it corresponded to the suggested reaction time available.
The 'report' (does it deserve that title?) makes no mention of what the effect of the coupled flight director might have been, or even if it was coupled at the time of the impact. Although I imagine they would have been 2-Cue if coupled, they could have been 3-Cue and it would have been pertinent to explore the effect that would have.
There are no recommendations that I can see, other than mention that a master caution or audio alert might have alerted the crew of low Nr.
All in all - if this really is the complete report - a very unsatisfactory publication
