OK, BOAC, you are concerned about the specific condition in which a pilot executing a vertical escape manoeuvre of some sort is unaware of the position of the longitudinal trim. There are two ways in which heshe could be unaware, namely (a) it is displayed and available, but not noticed, or (b) the position is not displayed in a readily-assimilable manner during the manoeuvre.
Situation (a) is what I call an attention failure (the "A" in the PARDIA flow-of-information classification). Situation (b) is a violation of what I call the Mutual Cognition of Relevant Parameters (MCRP) Criterion in my IET System Safety Keynote last year (Securing the Interface; I just noticed that we failed to put a copy on the WWW. I'll remedy that later). I think you are concerned about both situations, but I feel it appropriate to distinguish them.
You suggest it's a trend. It may be, or it may not be, I can't tell. What would be very helpful is to have a definitive list of situations in which (b) has occurred. I listed fatal accidents in the last four years in my post yesterday; maybe, if you have the time and motivation, you could write a definitive list of those incidents in which situation (b) has occurred and has arguably adversely affected the safety of flight. I think from my list only Turkish and XL Airways fit (there may be some speculation concerning others).
This is not an old concern. It arose during the Nagoya accident to a China Air Lines A300 in 1994. The report also identified other upsets (over Paris; over Moscow) in which automated trimming of the THS had led to pitch-ups and high-AoA situations in this line of aircraft (A300/310).
I advised counsel for the plaintiffs in the civil proceedings concerning the Nagoya accident in 1998 (the trial was in 1999, I believe). They didn't use my advice in court
AFAIK, but what I advised them was identical with what the court finally found.
You point out, though, that it is not only Airbus aircraft which engender situation (b). Which other aircraft are subject to it?
PBL