SP -
noted. I have absolutely nothing against the certification requirements - there has to be a base-line, be it right or in need of 'tweaking', against which a/c can be judged. My comments on this thread against the 'theoreticians'/certificators' has been that we are seeing more and more near or complete LOC at excessive pitch angles which arrive at FULLY stalled a/c.
I know from airtests that you cannot properly 'stall' a 737 in line with the airtest schedule- there is no more 'up elevator' available to stall the wing and we settle for declaring a benign gentle nose drop as the 'point of stall' when in fact it represents the limit of pitch control, so the 1g clean stall really has merit only in checking that the stall warning functions correctly and that there are no adverse excursions in roll, yaw or pitch NEAR the stall. The actual airtest stall has no relevance to the situations in which crews seem to be finding (?placing?) themselves.
Unfortunately the 'training system' has followed this philosophy and in my view, as I have often said, we need to thoroughly overhaul the training system for the glass cockpit and I completely endorse SP's last paragraph. Wittingly or unwittingly we have allowed ourselves to be 'automated' into a world where 'it can't happen'. Wandering only slightly off topic, PJ2's post on the TIP crash says "
It is just an airplane, and it requires flying skill; it is not a platform which requires mere "managing" and this is where I see the whole system failing - it encourages crew to 'manage' a complex and clever system and seems to forget the fact that when you press a few big red buttons the a/c and crew SHOULD be capable of just flying the a/c. The very point of my thread on the Safety Forum on the 'Computers in the cockpit etc'.