The following text is an extract from an address to the RAAF History Conference 1992 by Air Marshal Jake Newham, AC, Chief of Air Staff RAAF from 21 May 1985 to 2 July 1987.
AM Newham is a Korean War veteran having spent much of his Air Force career flying fighters and F-111. The first half of this segment gives an enlightening insight into the 'functioning' of the Department of Defence with the latter half detailing how the helicopter transferred decision transpired.
'The RAAF's view – and I know my Army and Navy colleagues supported it – was that the full kit of weaponry across the ADF was applicable in low level contingencies. It doesn't take much thinking to conclude that these capabilities are essential if distance is to be conquered and high casualties avoided. An important feature of these capabilities is their deterrent effect on escalation. I make the point that to run down any one element of the Air Force would open up a window of vulnerability. Dibb's emphasis on low level conflict was later used by FDA (Force Development & Analysis) to forestall development of the F-111, indeed, at one stage, FDA tried to get rid of it; the proposal was that the tactical fighter force would fill the gap. I felt that we really needed to find somebody to preach the Sermon on the Mount again (loaves and fishes) because we only had about 70 fighters.
Similarly, in the Army the requirements for artillery and armour were questioned by FDA on the same grounds, and even with my limited knowledge of land operations, I was appalled. The Navy was also affected. The size of the major surface warship acquisition recommended by Dibb was in the order of a corvette. Any of you who have had any experience with the patrol boats – and my experience was with the older Attack class – know that there are some sea states where you don't do anything with the ship, you don't eat, you don't sleep, you just hang on. You certainly don't fight. It didn't appeal to me to be putting Australian servicemen into inadequate ships. I have some reservations about surface combatants, they do have limitations, but they are important. I'm a supporter of the Anzac frigates as they are now, even though they cost a lot of money.
The Dibb review also had problems with offensive capabilities and being able to take the operational initiative. It was because Australia has a defensive strategy that the Dibb review advanced the opinion that we didn't need an offensive capability. This interested CGS and CNS as much as it did me. It took some argument to disabuse the Dibb team of that idea; to explain to them that even in a defensive environment one must have an offensive capability. Such was the meagre amount of knowledge that existed at the expert analyst level. I hope you're not still having problems with that notion but it was an article of faith with FDA at the time.
The time was that I thought the Dibb review my life's work as CAS, but I consoled myself with the view that the committee routine might be reduced. Unfortunately, words mean all things to all men and we had to keep going over the same business and fighting the same issues, even though I'd thought they had been disposed of at previous meetings. Let me give you an example.
In keeping with tradition, when I came back from America and was installed as DCAS, the Chief went away on a trip. Before he left he said: 'There's a Force Development Committee meeting on Thursday, would you hold the fort for me?' Of course, there were two major Air Force projects and the budget on the agenda. The staff pumped me up and I trudged across the exercise yard there with my arm nearly coming out of its socket from the weight of papers. The first item was an Army project and as it unfolded I thought: 'I haven't been away. Its the same words, its the same status'. There we were, 2 years down the track repeating the pantomine.
In the three posts that I held in Air Force Office, I got thoroughly tired of the committee process. We went over the same ground time and time again. Yet exactly where projects are in the Five Year Program means little until they reach the Budget Year. Nevertheless, there we were, examining Year 2 items as though they were new. We were going through the process for the sake of it. I got tired of the nugatory paperwork. I'm anti-paperwork, I always have been. If the mass of papers could be reduced to a level acceptable to private business the Greenies would be put out of work.
There was another technique which I found particularly offensive. It was not unusual for a member around the committee table to ask about issues explained in the agendum itself, the DP1, or whatever papers had been circulated before the meeting. When this was explained, the response would be: 'Oh, I haven't got time to read that'. It was an attitude I found arrogant and insulting.
Let me get on to helicopters. The Dibb review did not mention the transfer of helicopters to Army in the body of the paper. Nor was the matter ever discussed by Dibb with the Chiefs of Staff. Instead the proposal appeared as an unsupported recommendation in Dibb's recommendations. It was apparent that something was in the wind.
Before the Dibb review had finished the CGS made a bid for the transfer of helicopters. Subsequently the matter was studied by a committee chaired by the then Commodore MacDougall. The committee has six members, four sailors, one Army and one Air Force. With one dissension the report recommended the preservation of the status quo with some procedural recommendations; that is that the RAAF should continue to operate the helicopters. I had no problems with the procedural recommendations at all; they were completely in harmony with my and my colleagues' views of providing adequate support to the other Services. What is more, I believed that the recommendations of the helicopter review committee were also in harmony with the CDF's philosophy of the oneness of the Australian Defence Force, and that was what we were working towards.
Following the MacDougall Committee's report, the matter was discussed in COSC. This is what happened, and if I make an error, there are at least two people in this room who can put me straight. The COSC was attended by the outgoing Secretary, Sir William Cole. That was unusual; perhaps it was because resource issues were involved. CGS's opening address ignored the MacDougall review completely, which had me scratching my head because my preparation was based on the MacDougall report. CNS followed and agreed with the report's recommendations, that is, that the RAAF should retain the helicopters. I weighed in by protesting about the way the meeting was being conducted. It was being run exactly as if a new project was introduced by a Chief of Operations at the Force Structure Committee, which of course was quite improper. I was overruled. Then the CDF dealt his card, saying that he'd been agonising over night over the matter, and he'd only just made his mind up. He thought the helicopters should be transferred to the Army, and handed round a prepared statement to that effect.
After lunch Sir William Cole failed to appear (because his retirement was imminent?) and there was some general discussion. We then went to a vote. Over the lunch break CNS had reversed his decision. He now supported the CGS and CDF, which meant that the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (Air Marshal Funnell) and I were out-voted.
I announced my intention of seeing the Minister. It was an interesting meeting. Minister Beazley was the most passive I'd ever seen him. Indeed, re resisted only one response, and that was to frown when at one stage I was hitting the table. So, I put my hand in my pocket and continued. I reminded the Minister of the MacDougall report, our track record in supporting the other services with the helicopters, the fact that there was nothing in exercise reports to indicate dissatisfaction, and that on the contrary we had recently received laudatory comments following and exercise in 1986 in the Emerald area. That exercise had been a precursor to Kangaroo 86 which had also gone well. On this, Mr. Beazely commented: 'But that's the only time', referring to the Emerald exercise, which made me prick my ears up and launch into a restatement of points made earlier. I concluded that I couldn't understand the decision, particularly in view of CDF's comments about the unity of the ADF and the way we were working.
Mr. Beazley was a bit like Pontius Pilate, he seemed to wash his hands of the affair, yet later I recalled getting a message from London to say the Minister had announced on a visit not long before that that the Army would get the helicopters. David Evans and I, at the launching of Paul Dibb's book on the Soviet Union at the ANU some months before, had also overheard Mr. Beazley tell a group of people that he was going to give the helicopters to the Army. So much for his stance. This left me wondering why we'd gone through this nugatory exercise with so much staff effort and so much anguish.
At this stage I should mention Ian Sinclair's political advice: 'Never complain, never explain and never apologise'. I'm not complaining, I'm here at a history conference to tell you what happened. I could see Army's argument for having the helicopters under their control, but I believe that given the unity of the ADF, our track record, and the proposed command and control arrangements – which we were quite happy to meet – the decision was wrong.
I was a bit put out afterwards and so were others. When CDF visited units after the decision he would rubbish the Helicopter review (the MacDougall Committee report) as 'that silly little report', which was rather embarrassing for Commodore MacDougall. It didn't endear the CDF to me and, it's something I won't forget. Furthermore, the Acting Secretary sent a minute to CDF which also rubbished the MacDougall report. The minute was not addressed to the RAAF, and when I learnt of its existence and asked CDF for a copy I was told that it didn't exist, which I thought was unethical. I also thought it was rather stupid, given the habit these sorts of papers have, of wandering through copying machines.
Let's leave the helicopter transfer. It was a tremendous blow to a team of dedicated and highly skilled people in the Air Force, who were justifiably proud of their record.'