airworthiness issues that seem to have little bearing on this actual flight and the machinations of Whitehall and the dreaded Boscombe Down clique
bastOn
While I respect your right to an opinion, I am uncomfortable with such a stance from any aircrew.
The irrefutable evidence is that the airworthiness regulations were ignored to such a degree that both the CA Release and Release to Service were laughably non-compliant. That was so in November 1993 (initial issue of a fabricated CAR, which had no audit trail whatsoever to any formal Boscombe recommendation; or any other independent advisor) and remained the case at time of accident. That is not my opinion – it is a simple fact and the MoD correspondence proving it was published a week or so ago. As the aircraft did not remotely meet the mandated airworthiness regulations, in particular the appallingly immature status of various clearances (i.e. many completely missing), then I submit this had an impact on the flight safety; ultimately demonstrated by Flt Lt Tapper’s request for a Mk1. He knew.
The sudden denigration of such a respected organisation as Boscombe Down is incomprehensible. You can only be talking about Rotary Wing Test Squadron, as it was they who flagged the major issues preventing CAR/RTS. (And safety critical software being “positively dangerous” is MAJOR). In my experience, RWTS is/was largely staffed by your fellow Servicemen who, by definition, had to have front line experience. (And those I came to know very well had bags of it, not just with the UK but on exchange with Allies in-theatre). The first thing they are taught on taking up post is – here are the regulations. They are not guidelines, lab notes or rumour; but regulations to be followed to ensure the safety of both yourself and your fellow aviators. I have never met one who didn’t understand this and all were keenly aware they would probably be back flying the aircraft in their next tour. It is not their fault that, in 1993, it had been MoD policy for 2 years not to maintain airworthiness.
On Chinook, they did their job. DHP was advised the CAR should NOT be signed. He would have taken this to his boss, DGA2 (an RAF AVM). In turn, they would advise CA to sign (there would be little point walking the document into his office and advising him not to sign). Critically, at every stage ACAS and his staffs had to be involved. Part of the evidence required by CA (a requirement stated in his own CA Instructions) is that, before he signs, ACAS must state in writing he is content and will incorporate the CAR in his RTS. That letter forms a crucial part of the audit trail, confirming he has not been taken unawares by being offered something he cannot Release. This is were gross negligence took place, and only a comprehensive investigation and assessment of documents not made available to any inquiry will reveal who made the decision to ignore Boscombe, and their reasoning. I wonder who the PE > ACAS linkman was? And what reply/instructions was he receiving from his other master?