the Airbus FBW are set at or near the stress limits of the airframe, and it could be argued that any human input beyond that could do more harm than good. If you need more than 67 degrees of bank with TOGA power to get out of a situation, I'd be sceptical of anyone's chances. Habsheim is very much a red herring here (and in most arguments on the subject).
Point well taken, Dozy. Having flown both products extensively, however, I am somewhat aware of the flight path management skills required for each, and, as such, feel justified in contributing my own, albeit pilot-limited views on the subject.
The FBW enhancements, installed on the MD-11, would have prevented most of the accidents and incidents that have occurred to date. Said enhancements, however, have undergone a very tortuous development history, the Habsheim accident is a case in point (as are other very surreal computer-generated incidents), most certainly not the Red Herring you claim it to be.
The MD-11 remains, in very real ways, an old girl with old-girl habits, the electronic displays and protections are only so much make-up and lipstick, a DC-10 gussied up for a night on the town. She is, however, like the very venerable old Douglas cable and wire products, once grasped a very honest ship, and even though a truly unforgiving one, a pilot’s pure pleasure to fly.
The Airbus was not designed by pilots, it is a software package summarily attached to a wing. As an afterthought it sometimes seems.
The thrill is gone, my brother, the thrill is gone.