Pitot + PFDs
The issue with the pitot in isolation would appear to be not so grave so you have the authorities issuing warnings. Loss of airspeed is anticipated in the QRH and training.
However I think in the case of Airbus equipment we have a compounding secondary issue of the flight computers not gracefully handling the loss/corruption of airspeed sensor data.
So the authorities looking at the pitot issue by itself only see part of the problem. Much as the 5 blind men feeling parts of the elephant and each coming to different conclusions. What is need is a higher level perspective of the issue that combines all of the parts of the problem.
At the end of the day I can't understand how one sensor (ok 3 redundant pitots) can take out something as critical as an entire flight system. It appears that there are too many dependencies in the software that causes the pitot failure to initiate a chain of software errors that are not handled. Instead the errors cascade to secondary software modules which go into failed state. Good electronic/software design seeks to minimize coupling and un-necessary dependencies. Error exceptions are handled gracefully and trapped.