woodja51: There is a recent article in the latest FRAeS magazine 'out of the fog ' by a Capt Robert Scott.
Is there any online link to this? I keep finding Robert Scott the early 1900's Antarctic explorer instead.
I think you make some very good points, regarding the complexity of modern FCS, and a probable drift of skills more towards computer operator/systems diagnostician than reflexive pilot.
One key question will be whether situation was one that anyone, pilot or computer could have recovered from. It is possible that it was a recoverable upset per some of the other A330 upsets, made worse by weather, information overload, etc.
Another possibility is that the situation was completely beyond anyone's ability to recover from and the similarities to the other A330 upsets is only a component of the issue or coincidence (for example probe icing followed by structural failure).
I will try and find the doc again, but it that really put the loss of computers/automation/instruments into perspective for me, it mentioned that one way if you have conflicting information was to compare air speed to cockpit wind noise. How quickly things can get back to basics, and imagine that mid storm, mid crisis.
If we forgoe the piloting skills we reach the other extreme that is 2001-esqe. "Please save the plane HAL. I'm sorry Dave, I can't do that."
Somewhere in between is the fine balance that gives us the benefits and minimizes the risks.