On the weather near the Mull.
Perhaps, if I may point you at Mr Holbrook's considered, detailed, evidence that he gave to the HoL. It says it all;
64. When he gave evidence at the FAI, Mr Holbrook expressed the opinion that the pilot could have seen "the location of the Mull lighthouse" and described the low cloud as "hugging the Mull" (Sheriff's determination, p 110 of HL Paper 25(ii)). He was criticised by the Ministry of Defence for having given different versions of his account to the Board and the FAI. In these circumstances we invited him to give evidence, an invitation which he willingly accepted.
65. Mr Holbrook's evidence to us began with a statement which he had asked leave to make (Q 594). He explained that the low cloud clung to the contours of the high ground so that the location of the Mull massif itself was not in doubt from sea level. He considered that the crew of the aircraft when he saw it could determine without ambiguity where the Mull was and could see the cliffs, beach and lower perimeter walls of the lighthouse complex.
66. Mr Holbrook reaffirmed that when he saw the aircraft he could not see the physical features of the Mull but he went on to explain that he was able to see the location of the lighthouse complex because the buildings and the white perimeter wall showed up as a colour change against the background of the land mass (QQ 594, 602). The top of the lighthouse was in cloud as the cloud level moved up and down (Q 606). Mr Holbrook went on to explain that the cloud was following the contours of the land and was very localised (Q 615). He also remarked, as he had done before the Board, that the helicopter was in sunlight as it passed (Q 619). At that time the aircraft was about two miles to the south west of the lighthouse. He expressed the opinion that the aircraft was flying at a height of between 200 and 400 ft and that the crew would have been better able to see the position of the lighthouse than he was at sea level with a certain amount of spray (QQ 610-13). He estimated the speed of the aircraft to be 60-80 knots but did not feel confident enough to be dogmatic as he had not previously seen a Chinook in flight. However, it was his impression that the aircraft was travelling sufficiently slowly to be involved in a search and rescue operation (Q 639).
67. We do not consider that Mr Holbrook changed his evidence between his appearances before the Board and the FAI, rather that when he was subjected to professional examination and cross-examination at the FAI and to our questioning he was able to expand upon the rather brief evidence which he had given to the Board. We had no hesitation in accepting him as a reliable and convincing witness.
This statement is perhaps
the most relevent and revealing of ALL the witnesses because it is the closest we can get to estimating 'the view from the cockpit' as the ac approached the Mull.
From the statement, it is quite clear to envisage that the mass of the Mull, despite being shrouded in contour-hugging, upslope cloud, was clearly recognisable and below the base of this stratus (and yes, the witnesses on the Mull were in this cloud), the area around the lower portion of lighthouse was also visible. Above that, he also estimates the more-extensive, main cloudbase (broken strato-cu?) to be about 1000ft (through which sun was shining) and that the ac was travelling more slowly than first thought (ie it had probably slowed down). The evidence of Mr Holbrook clearly shows that the ac
was in VMC and the crew would have been able to avoid the clearly-distinguishable mull, either vertically or navigate laterally. Walt's earlier picture illustrates this well.
If image doesn't work - try this
MullOroCloudOnly picture by grauniad - Photobucket
For whatever reason' however, the crew didn't and they flew into the cliff. Furthermore, they must have been aware of their predicament from about 10 secs out (as they would ahve been visual with the cloud-coveredMull. It begs the question as to why they didn't turn away/stop? There are many possible reasons - UFCM, jam, engine probs, distraction, LZ, low rate of climb, take your pick! Even the BOI's eventual choice; a low ROC was only defined as a "probable cause". 'Probable' is NOT 'with no doubt whatsoever'.....but we just don't know why
for sure. Why indeed, would 2 hugely-talented pilots and an exceptional crewman navigate/fly into a clearly distinguishable lump of culmulo-granite? I defy anyone to state why; with 'no doubt whatsoever'!
Based on Mr Holbrook's testimony, however, one can be certain (as much as one can be) is that the crew did
not negligently fly "towards high ground, at high speed, too low, in cloud and below SAlt " because they were not at high speed, they were not too low and they were not in cloud! Perhaps they only entered the contour-hugging stratus in the last few second before impact? What is also certain is the crew were
not guilty of Gross Negligence "at, or before, the WP change" (probably about half-way between Mr Holbrook and the cliffs). Perhaps if the BOI had more thoroughly inteviewed Mr Holbrook (he only received a small number of formal questions) or if the BOI had searched more thoroughly for the crews on the scottish trawlers that Mr Holbrook was avoiding (ie in Scotland), then maybe the BOI and ROs would have had a more accurate idea of the last couple of minutes of ZD576; someone aboard those trawlers may even have watched the flight-path of of the ac its last few seconds, before it entered the cloud and then hit the cliffs. Of course the reason why the BOI did things in a bit of a hurry is the 'time-factor' placed upon the board and their relative lack of experience in dealing with accidents; not their fault. Still, perhaps it is not too late to ask more questions - does anyone have an inkling from where the trawlers came - its not like our fishing fleet is as huge as it was? Sadly, I doubt this will lead anywhere after so long.
Nonetheless, a majority of the RO findings are built on sand and supposition but Mr Holbrook totally undermined the basis of these suppositions at the HoL; why has it taken people to so long to realise it? Of course, the MoD will always do all they can to poo-pooh the yachtsman but Mr Holbrook's HoL testimony clears up all almost all the loose ends leading up to those final seconds of ZD576, details of which will always remain uncertain.
Uncertainty = doubt. Therefore, while the ROs (and others) may be sure in their own minds that the crew were negligent but,
based on the evidence (as laid down in law), they cannot logically and unequivocably deduce this; the burden of proof is not met.
Quod Erat Demonstrandum.
Furthermore, I would suggest that many other cases where deceased crews have been found negligent (apparently there were 20 between 1980 and 1997) could be contested on this basis.