WK - I appreciate your full response there. I am confused to some extent by your assumption that STANS would/could be in error after a sea crossing. I understand STANS is GPS driven with Doppler backup, in which case there is little reason for errors? Of interest, however, in the HoL report you link to, one 'Lord' states clearly that the machine had only TANS, and not STANS, so what do we think of the whole enquiry there?
I think I have personally exhausted this line (the LDZ 'deception'), and I am certain the key to overturning this finding lies in the illogical assumption that the crew were 'in fog' at WPT change and thus 'grossly negligent' to continue IMC towards the terrain. Since this CANNOT be determined, and is unlikely in my opinion, I am sure there are other causes for this accident.
I do not 'dismiss' yours out of hand, but the overwhelming LACK of evidence of both the equipment and the planning to use such that day persuades me that it is a dead end.
I can still find no evidence as yet from the supposed 'planner' of the sortie. Is there any? Who was 'he'?
EDIT:
JP - I had seen your post, and again I do not find such a plan 'logical' from my experience both of operating west coast (or any coast) VMC/low level and the known Mull weather patterns, of which they would, I'm sure, have been fully aware. Competent pilots would, I am again sure, aim to pass close by the coast/lighthouse as a 'fix'. To aim to 'skim' over upslope stratus covered terrain would not be something that this undoubtably 'competent' crew would have undertaken.
Again, we will never know.