Assuming that the accident came about because of extreme weather conditions (and that's still conjecture, I know), and given that other flights made the journey safely, at roughly the same time, I can only see the following possibilities:
1. AF447 was acting with the same caution as other operators, but experienced freak conditions (eg, lightning at a distance from the storm cell, or an unusually fast-developing cell).
2. AF447 was acting with the same caution as other operators, but did not have access to the same information about weather problems in front of them. (eg, inoperative weather radar).
3. AF447 was not acting with the same caution as other operators.
No.3 is the one that this community could usefully explore, I think.
Presumably, when approaching areas of difficult weather, there is a level of severity where the decision is to fly around the area rather than grit one's teeth and plunge through? This has to be the captain's decision, ultimately, but to what extent is the assessment affected by company expectations, or peer-group culture? How does the decision get made?
To what extent might exaggerated trust in the robustness of the airframe affect the decision? (Air France, Airbus, after all).
Please note: I'm not suggesting irresponsibility on the part of the operator or the crew. But I'd be interested to know how pilots here - who I assume are from a wide range of operators, of different ages, different locales - go about the business of deciding what to do about dodgy weather ahead.