Well, and there we have it.
It seems that the investigation pretty much points to the pilots forgetting to deploy the flaps and slats and no related mechanical malfunction other than the TOWS (as it was obvious already to anyone familiar with the situation).
It seems that right when the time to set the flaps/slats on the after start checklist came, the pilot can be heard on the CVR tell the copilot (running the actions) something like: "Take this chance now" meaning to take advantage of a gap in the tower radio busy communications to ask for taxiing clearance, so the checklist was interrupted at that point and permission asked over the radio.
It can be inferred that they later forgot this item and to properly deploy and check the wing configuration and that they only paid lip service (or nothing at all) to any posterior verifications (in the taxi checklist under briefing and in the inminent takeoff under Final Items).
The maintenance technician that checked the aircraft in Barcelona the night before the accident to attend to the problem of "excessive RAT temperature indications" reported by a pilot the day before, declared to have run the whole set of tests as indicated in the repair manual and found all systems working, indicating that perhaps the relay suspected to be faulty had actually an intermitent electrical problem (dirty/stuck contacts, loose or fractured cable connections or whatever).
This same relay, as we know, would've caused the erratic function of two devices: the RAT probe heater, which turned itself on while on the ground right before the accident, and the Take Off Configuration Warning System, which didn't sound in this accident in spite of the investigation pointing to a configuration error (flaps and slats not deployed).
At this time, the investigation officially hints to what we know: crew error due to "rushed" and not 100% "professional" operation of the checklists and procedures coupled with a recent hard-to-diagnose malfunction that wasn't properly noticed or corrected on time and made the configuration alarm inoperative for the takeoff.
The other circunstances surrounding the flight (heavy weight, tail wind, low air density, unfortunate random stall behaviour that deviated the aircraft from the runaway), completed the picture of the accident.
The judge is still trying to determine if the actions of the maintenance technician that disabled the RAT heater minutes before the accident constituted an act of neglicency.
And I guess this about wraps it up until the whole CVR transcript is made public and the official investigation ends a couple of years from now.
The judge is planning on closing the judiciary investigation much sooner, probably in six months or less.
May all the ones that lost their lifes in this unfortunate accident rest in peace. From everyone in pprune, our condolences to their families and friends and we sincerely hope steps can be taken to make as sure as humanly possible that it doesn't happen again.
Last edited by justme69; 17th Dec 2008 at 06:27.