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Old 24th Oct 2008, 14:50
  #2283 (permalink)  
Bis47
 
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Belgium
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Quest for continuous improvement

Hello !

justme69
I've said it before. Better training never hurts, but I also think that it's each pilot's responsability to learn as much as he can about the machine he is driving past the point of "reasonable performance" that he obtains together with his license.

I fully agree … and not only to learn more about the machine, but also about other very important aspects of his job. It is part of the required « enthousiasm » that is a character of good pilots. It is pure « airmanship ». If you are interested, I recommend « Flying kow-How » and « Flying the weather » by Robert N. Buck (Macmillan).

However, not all the pilots have the proper culture to progress by themselves in the several « improvement » paths. That is the reason every airline has a « training » department, even if they don’t provide basic training or type rating. Instructors, chief instructors, head of operations … should have - collegially - the required culture, experience, airmanschip and information (error reporting litterature) to design an appropriate « continuous improvement » program.

It is nowaday recognized that the initial type rating could not provide all the in-depth kowledge of an aircraft. You have to build that in-depth kowledge by adding layers of kwowledge above layers of training and operational experience. With proper supervision an progressive checking.

The fact is that there is litlle or no « standard » about that continuous improvement of competency and airmanship. Its rests upon the shoulders of the chief pilots and instructors.
So each time you hear « Our airline is fully complying with the standards » … it means NOTHING.
Or , in fact, it means : « we are satisfied with minimum standards » L

justme69
I think this particular type of accidents are the ones that can receive most benefits from better technology, rather than rely on better human knowledge (that comes from increased training, of course).
1. Obviously, MacDouglas and Boeing should have done better ...


2. Better human knowledge (of the aircraft systems and other safety related toppics) doest not come from « more » training, it comes from better training … Better training is given by better instructors, using appropriate tools and a better syllabus. You don't need the latest multi-million simulator to train better pilots, what you need is :
- first class instructors (instructors with extra airmanship, instructors who think ) – not the kind of « repetitors » that are so frequent among sim instructors …
- selected pilots … applicants selected and trained not for their parents wealth, but for their smartness and enthousiasm for flying.

When airlines used to train their future pilots ab-initio and for free , their first objective was to select « the right stuff » .

Only a very limited percentage (5% or so) of applicants made it to the right seat of an airliner.
Today, training is given by commercial subcontractor, and paying trainees are indeed « customers ». You won’t reject customers …
Selection is a joke. It is just a selection by the money … So, only a very limited percentage of applicants are rejected in commercial FTO’s and TRO’s.


3. Better technology can help … to some extend. Airbus was supposed to provide that cutting edge technology improvement towards flight safety. You think they made it ?

Actually, the best improvement in flight safety came with the introduction of CRM and scenario based recurrent training. A real improvement from the previous « macho » philosophy. Still a long way to go (at least with Spannair) :
- A properly CRM trained crew member would "never ever ever" accept a sloppy challenge and response check list. (Just considering it as an insult ...)
- A properly scenario trained crew would know better about stress and distractions …

justme69
I've already stated that my opinion, given the impossibility to trust the pilots to NEVER EVER EVER forget the killer items, is to improve the reliability of the warning systems by requiring more frequent tests by the crew, improving the design and improving the maintenance manuals to help recognize failures.

I do not agree with the "more frequent test" remedy.
The main business of a pilot is not to test again and again his parachute … The main business of a pilot is to make sure not to have to use that last ressort safety net.
Before take off, there are much more important items to check, rechek and cross-chek … The system tests should really be kept to the minimum (I agree with a test during the prestart scan ... as a normal pilot habit!)
But, once the aircraft starts moving, chek list should be restricted to the killer items, and to those items that were impossible to set/check while the aircraft was at the stand.

sevenstrokeroll
I BLAME THE AIRLINE(spanair) FOR NOT TEACHING< TESTING< the pilot's and mechanics in the same knowledge area that I was taught and tested in.

I fully agree.
For the same reason that the maintenance manager has to report to justice, I think the chief pilot and a few other managers should be involved as well.

An airline his supposed to have a strong structure garanteeing safe operation :
- a trainging departement and a flight ops department working in close relationship. They are supposed to be headed by very competent and experimented « responsible managers »
- a quality manager, a quality system and a safety officer working in close relationship, and coordinating/supporting other managers efforts.
- scheduled quality management meeting, examining audit reports and propositions for improvement.

Let us not forget the triple mission of the quality system :
- make sure that mandatory standards are complied with. We know that lobbying by short sighted cost conscious airlines have reduced those standards to a level well below what was previously in force by first class airlines. Just a paper work challenge ...
- seek for continuous improvement above those bare minimums. It means of course … see at it that the "responsible managers" really work in that direction ! A very exciting challenge indeed, provided that all the managers are willing to play and that they have the time and smartness to be honnest players.
- keep the top management "in the loop".


It is a fine structure ...
But that structure did fail ...well before the crew entered the airplane that day.
There was a latent defect somewhere ...
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