25 years of holding at Williamtown
Next year marks the 25th anniversary of my solo flight around the world. During that flight of over 350 hours, the only place I was held was at the edge of the Williamtown control zone – close to Newcastle, NSW. I was held there for about 15 minutes, orbiting over Nobbys at 500 feet, because a Beech 1900 or something similar was departing in an easterly direction from the airport in CAVOK conditions.
It is interesting that only a few weeks ago I was held again at Williamtown, and I have spoken to other pilots who are regularly held at Nobbys, orbiting at 500 feet. One claimed to have been held with two other aircraft – so three of them were orbiting at 500 feet inside the control zone under ATC instructions. A collision would have meant that two flaming aircraft would end up on the crowded beach at Nobbys.
You may ask, “Why is this so?” I believe it is because of an almost complete lack of leadership in the hierarchy of ATC in the Air Force in Canberra. In my experience, our military controllers are as good as any in the world. It is just that they are totally let down by people who move up into management positions and should therefore be updating the rules.
Over the last 25 years I have spoken at different times to the people in charge of air traffic control at Williamtown. They have always expressed frustration at having to hold VFR aircraft at Nobbys, but have explained that is what their rules require. It appears that when an IFR flight planned aircraft departs Williamtown (even if it is a Cessna 172) there is no way that the controller can ensure that this aircraft will reach 1,000 feet by the coast – 3 miles away. This means that there may not be adequate “separation” between the IFR aircraft and a VFR aircraft flying in the light aircraft lane at 500 feet.
I have written to the various people at Williamtown and in Canberra to no avail. There appears to be not the slightest grasp in the military that holding aircraft like this costs money and needlessly reduces safety. I can sure see why the military purchasing programs are such an enormous stuff-up if this is the calibre of their management.
About 15 years ago I was told that the procedures were going to be fixed so they were like other modern aviation countries in the world. Of course nothing happened.
A few weeks ago I was instructed to hold at Nobbys so I asked for a radar vector. You won’t believe it, the vector they gave me took me towards New Zealand out across the ocean! This wasn’t a matter of bastardry – it was simply an air traffic controller trying to comply with 1930s type rules. On this particular occasion the reason for the delay was a single regional aircraft – I think it was a Metro – about to depart from Williamtown some 8 miles away from Nobbys.
The situation can be solved by having Class D airspace at Williamtown, but the military has steadfastly refused to consider such an option. A controller told me that having Class D airspace with Class C above would be impossible to operate. I wonder if they have ever spoken to the controllers at places like Albury and Coffs Harbour?
This obstructionism can have little to do with safety because on weekends or during Christmas holidays (when there is more RPT traffic than ever) the air traffic controllers go home, the area becomes a giant CTAF, and everyone arranges their own “separation.” During these times I have never seen an aircraft holding at Nobbys – or indeed, anywhere.
Airline pilots have told me that when they depart IFR from Williamtown on runway 12, they are at least 1,500 feet when they cross the coast line, and most claim that they turn onto track before they get to the coast anyway. This means that there is no way an IFR aircraft can collide with a lighty in the lane at 500 feet.
Imagine if we ever had a war – with the present people in senior positions in the Air Force seemingly unable to make any decision which requires lateral thinking and real leadership. It would probably be like WWII, where I understand that after about 6 months of chaos, the bureaucrats who had attained high positions in the military were sacked and competent people replaced them.
When Angus Houston, the then Chief of Air Force, sat with me on the Aviation Reform Group over three years ago at endless meetings, he assured me and others that the military totally supported moving to the North American NAS system. He said that he had flown in the US and thought it was one of the best systems in the world. He was totally committed to introducing the advantages into Australia. What happened? Absolutely nothing. If the Chief of the Air Force can have no effect on getting his people to move forward to modern practices, you just wonder if anyone can.
What do others think?