When you get the "WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP warning, you pull up. When the warning ceases, it means you cleared the obstacle.
It also means that you're dead, in which case the warning is also no longer needed.
In fact I have THE solution that will satisfy everybody :
Cancel the *Retard* call-out altogether, just like Boeing has never done. May be the pilots will become more intelligent and not rely on a synthetic voice to cue them on a primary flying school basic, simple action.
Then the blame will be solely on their souls and we'd have saved a lot of storage place for Danny, doing away with weird theories,by some who don't have the first clue on technical aspects of the discussion (like those still unable to read a set of FDR graphs after 2619 posts and 80 days of varied informations).
The real problem that this state of affairs poses is that, very conveniently, while the discussion - ad nauseum - about "
not the pilots' fault, must be the aircraft" goes on, the other aspects of the accident are not covered :
- How was the flight prepared at POA ? Were the crew provided with sufficient landing data that the planning was for GRU (?), with the proviso of an en-route reversion to the scheduled flight ?
- The thoroughness of that flight preparation could be also questioned : 31 minutes from WonW to WoffW, minus taxi times, minus deplaning and boarding times, minus walk-around, minus the dealing times with all intervenants... on blue weather could be done...but for a flight onto a dicey runway with adverse weather and an inop T/R, I seriously doubt the quality of such preflight.
- When the decision was made to land at CGH, where did the information come from ? The airline ? The ATC ? and on what data ? We must remember that the airport was closed after a Pirep for slipperiness made the airport authorities measure a 6 mm contamination, then reopened when the rain became a drizzle ; as the windshield wipers were witched on on short final, this suggests that the rain had started again. Enough to trigger the slipperiness ?
- When the decision was made to land at CGH, The crew QRH page on LDR should have raised a few alarms : At their planned landing weight (info available on the Fuel page of the MCDU), they would have needed 1840m -had they considered *wet*, or discovered that they were outside the LDA had they considered *3 to 6 mmm of standing water*. (LDR = 2130 m at sea level, so no need to go any further). To stress this point further, an LDA of 1880 m is respected at weights under 50 tons, putting them some 13 tons over the *accepted* limit. (source : QRH, Full flaps-no reverse-no autobrake).
Other aspects to follow.