PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil
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Old 2nd Oct 2007, 10:03
  #2630 (permalink)  
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Portugal
Posts: 39
Now is the TL sensor failure a total failure or an "unknown" failure. The safest would be TOGA and see, or max rev and see. but again, it's that select reverser immediately that's causing me the headaches... as it leaves them with little or no choice!
The split second decision I know I could make facing a failure, would be to immediately shut down eng#2 (fuel lever off), as it would solve part of the problem and still leave me with good enough hydraulics. And I probbably would do it without PNF confirmation, which although in the ground, would be a bit unorthodox concerning recommended task sharing. The decision I know I would't make is to go-around, as getting airborne with a dubious flt control problem (although not in that chapter, throttles ARE flt controls as well in my picture) would be a bad decision. All this would take as much time as reading the first 6 words of this paragraph, and assuming there was a detected failure condition, wich we don't know if it's the case in this accident.

I think that in this case, we are looking either at a very basic human failure, or a system malfunction, that's still to be unveiled. If there was the human failure, maybe AI can develop a way to mitigate the effect of this kind of events, but that's not very meaningfull to me, as grosse errors will allways occur, unfortunately. If there was a system malfunction, then AI could have a major problem, because it would probbably show a weak point in the phillosophy of the design, and that might be unmaneageble, in such a widespread aircraft generation. One thing is to work on a new design (you know the A380 has it's sidesticks interconnected and moving together?), tottaly different is to work on a flying model.

Yes we are all hoping an accident like this will not happen again but the main causes at the moment appear to be pilot induced so we should all be saying " I HAVE LEARNT ABOUT FLYING FROM THIS" I do not want to make those mistakes!!!
Absolutely right! But this applies to all HF related accidents. Unfortunately, new catastrophic situations will allways occur, and we can only learn from those that allready happened. That's why, if this is a human error primary cause accident, it is not much different from other accidents, because failing to retard 1 throttle at touchdown is not AI responsability. If there is a system failure, then we will have a serious problem.

Oh yes it did. If the two computers linked to the yokes had different amounts of pressure set to disengage the autopilot, the autopilot would read as disengaged on the side with the lower pressure setting, but would read still engaged on the other side. This led to the world's first widebody disaster, Eastern Airlines EAL401 over the Everglades in Florida.
That's one way to see that accident. Another is that there were 5 guys in that cockpit, all looking at tiny inop green light, and nobody was flying the aircraft at a 2000 feet night visual circuit pattern. The cockpit discipline that comes built in on Airbus types, is for me the major AI achievement. The L1011 Everglades accident was primarily a bad CRM accident. Of course there was also the AP disconnection force issue. But I said that the Tristar had few bugs, not any bugs at all

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