EMIT, PJ2, good points, and relevant to the quest of gaining an understanding as to why crews might forget or overlook checks and actions.
I support manual flight = manual thrust. Having hands-on provides a vital link with the brain, and even if the TLs are not moving (auto thrust) the hand/brain is positioned for the next activity, this contributes to situation awareness – projecting ahead, and can be a reminder ‘to do something’.
RWA Re our recent posts, I believe that we are in agreement.
Re your questions on the ‘human factor’ angle. Several researchers have shown that experience defined by flight hour has little relationship to the likelihood of experiencing error. Furthermore many accident scenarios identify simultaneous failures by both crew members (an observation on CRM and monitoring, or that both are experiencing the same situation?).
Several mainstream researchers relate human behaviour and thus the susceptibility to error, directly to the situation that they are experiencing; this also includes how the situation developed, the assumptions, biases, and external pressures (context) – including what James Reason refers to as latent factors.
Therefore an answer, or at least another view on your question (#2423), might come from understanding the situation from the pilot’s point of view. Factually this may be limited; however, with reasonable assumption (meaningful speculation) and avoiding hindsight bias, we should be able to identify some areas of interest (as above).
For those seeking statistics; if the number of TL ‘hang ups’ (errors) is quite high then the lack of associated incidents/accidents might tell us something about error management.
Most people have been looking at the technology end of the human-system interface; a few are now enquiring about the human aspects, but error management provides an opportunity to consider the actual link between the larger ‘system’ and the human and the many things which affect it, the situation, external pressures etc.
This view could be developed by considering that in the two most recent accidents the error management appears to have failed, if so why?