However from the FDR data, the previous landing in CGH by the same crew (presumably performed by the same PF) showed the #2 thrust lever being left in idle and the #1 in reverse. Then, the following landing in Porto Alegre (presumably with the other guy as PF) shows that both thrust levers were recorded in reverse during the landing. In the fateful and final landing into CGH from Porto Alegre, the #2 lever was left in climb.
The crew of the previous flight (BH-CGH) was not the same. The PF worked during the previous years for Transbrasil and Passaredo, fliying on Boeing 737, and, if he really did a mistake, it is possible that this fact could in some way have contributed to it. But, in any case, it should be stressed that TAM's pilots did follow different procedures for the same kind of situation.