I would say thats an excellent question but many here choose not to face it and instead look the other way.Seems we have 3 camps:
a)the AB pilots who naturally dont want to see the design error
b)the resident "experts" who just love discussing the man-machine interface
c)simple folk who think its a bad idea to have reverse unless and until BOTH TL's are at IDLE.
I dont say the tech jargon from camp (b)(if I could only understand what the hell they're saying)and the denial from camp(a) hasnt been interesting.It has.
rananim,
As is beginning to seem usual and repetitive in your posts, you appear to have placed the cart before the horse. Or, perhaps it's the placement of the cranium relative to another beast of burden? Whichever.
You, and any others who are under the illusion that operating an aircraft makes one an apologist for its design need to wake up and recognize some important facts. No serious professional here wishes to see the propogation of inferior designs. We have to work with them and consequently we have a vested interest in seeing that they are is good as they possibly can be. If any design is found to have a significant weakness that compromises safe operation we will want it fixed.
Where I, and I suspect other "Camp A" pilots as well other technically knowledgeable contributors part ways with you is in the process of analysis. Your approach as laid out in post #1715 has been:
Its not an AB/Boeing thing I can assure you although I do admit that I have deep-seated mistrust of the AB design.I quite understand though that as long as a pilot forgets everything hes been taught and learns the new concept,everything should be just fine....
You choose to start with a conclusion, that the design is flawed, and work it back to an attribution of cause. That, however, is not how analysis works, and it is fortunate that at least a few people here recognize that.
One particular difference that informs the posts from contributors who have flown the aircraft is simply that. They have flown the aircraft and have experience with its strengths and weaknesses and are capable of putting what we know of this accident into context with those experiences.
Another particular difference is the tendency to not make assumptions beyond their scope of knowledge. You, on the other hand, have chosen to conclude that the accident was induced by design without having the benefit of being able to assess the full set of environmental, design, corporate, training and individual human elements that may be involved. It seems you would prefer to jump to your sole conclusion in ignorance of these factors instead of investigating them fully and impartially in search of a complete set of causal factors.
So far as I've seen, those from your camp A (who are neither in denial nor "not wanting to see)" have tried to explain the aircraft's systems processes and operating procedures as they understand them to those who, like yourself, don't. They have not been busy advocating a specific conclusion for the simple reason that they know there is a great deal of information that is not publicly available, and most of that which is is in a raw state and has yet to be rigorously analyzed.
ELAC