Dani...
Please stop all theories about what could have gone wrong inside the thrust quadrant aso,
Agreed... whilst the "theory" route I am sure will be examind by the pros, let's leave it to them. It is surely only a small probability?
the only discussion we should continue is to why the CM1 left TL 2 in CLB detent and what ergonomic improvement could be done to avert another (a third or even more) case.
I am not sure we should discuss this in too much depth without the appropriate qualifications / training. As for "what ergonomic improvement... " I again do not believe much needs to be done. It has been addressed by the MEL change, and the timing of that change, and/or promulgation seem unfortunate to say the least
AFAIK there have been ~3 recorded instances where the failure to retard did, or might have occurred (2 x accident, 1 x experience early in this thread?). All were operating under the (now changed) MEL for 1 T/R Inop. So amongst millions of Airbus landings, we have ~3 exhibiting a common "HF error" all with one other "factor" which seems to lead to the error. Remove that factor (now done) and the driver for the "error" seems to have gone. In fact, one better, the new MEL (select full Rev on both) also improves / changes the logic trees...
I am sure there will be many other recommendations / lessons in the Final Report, but as you say, I think the Airbus advice from shortly after the accident cures the basic root causes...
NoD