You disagree with the picture of the crew's mental state in those crucial last seconds that I've tried to envision further up.
I did not, but no matter how open you could be, your theory is only one possibility among dozens of others and I really believe that, bar a similar emergency on a personal experience, you have no right to claim tour theory as representing the truth.
why a secondary exit from the "spoilers armed" state would be a bad idea (let's say a manual spoilers override lever or an override by something like 90% manual brakes applied).
The main problem of the solution you advocate is that it calls for
MORE automation and airplane actions that, in the very unlikely event we are discussing, would introduce an extra element of surprise, with more negative reactions from the crew. I know, I've been there ...
Would that have fixed the 1.2 EPR issue? No, and I have to say I have no good answer for that without going into discussing a tactile feedback from the throttles again. Suggestions?
My point is that there is no different reaction from any airplane I know : Disconnect the automatic management of the thrust with a throttle in any position and you'll have, from the engine, a reaction consistent with the throttle actual setting. What does that have to do with moving throttles or not ? Isn't an important throttle stagger a visual and tactile feed-back enough ?
As forr suggestions, read my precedent post.
Regards.