WE obviously do not read the same posts in the same way. I haven't seen on this thread a single Airbus pilot who's said that it shouldn't happen to him, or have they showed a blind trust to the system.
This said, why don't we bury the War Axe ?
So why could this accident happen then?
It's for the psychologists and the F.H specialists to give us the answer. Taking the
facts of this plane history ,we could say :
- The plane was dispatched to CGH with marginal performance for a *wet* runway and -according to a few mentioned other airlines FCOM -the de-activated T/R should have been a non-dispatchable item for a *contaminated* runway.
- From the conversation the pilots had with the F/A. at the beginning of the CVR transcript, there has been a doubt, as to the possibility of landing at CGH.
- The crew was seriously concerned about :
-The state of the runway
-The item that made this landing different - what we call a *peculiarity* during our pre-descent briefing -, which was the availability of only one T/R.
-The weather which made them approach with the very unusual dual autopilot configuration which one only uses for an autoland.
-The -unsaid- worry for a possible go-around and circuit if the runway wasn't cleared in time by the then departing airplane.
- The Captain handling had a high workload piloting the final : not only because of the weather but also concentrating on the *one dot low* decision he made with the F/O's agreement ( How I'd like to have these missing 20 minutes of the CVR !). A landing , as close to the threshold as possible on an airfield that looks like an aircraft carrier in the middle of a densely built-up area was his intent and it was not an easy one.
(On this subject,the approach speed seemes too high for the published weight of 62.7 tons, making me think about a pilot input rather than the *managed* choice.)
- At touch-down, only one T/L was idled - #1 -then passed into reverse, de-activating the auto-thrust and freezing #2 engine output to it's approach thrust.
- The *not at or near idle* condition of #2 T/L inhibited the activation of both the ground spoilers and the auto-brakes. The spoiler *not deployed* status was called-out by the F/O ; the absence of speedbrake *Decel* message was not .
- .............
- The effective attempt to use pedal braking occurred only after 11 seconds post touch-down.
- At the same time, an apparent transfer of control to the F/O was recorded on the FDR and confirmed by the Hot mike #1 -the Captain's - urging " vai, vai ....vira " which can be translated colloquially as "Go on, Go on...Turn !"-.
- ..............
There are around some clever people who will give us an explanation as to why some vital, routine, ingrained, gestual items can be omitted by human beings. I'm not one of them but I have seen, both on the airplane and on the sim some pretty extraordinary behaviour.
Designing new extra warnings is not the best solution, it will add only more confusion...Put enough pressure on two very good pilots in the sim, give them an emergency and see that in all probability, they could go on their dealing with it and completely disregard the flasing light that's blinding them and the aural warning that's deafening them and makes their communicatin very difficult (see above the contribution of someone who was in an ejection...).
Moreover, during landing, both pilots tend to concentrate on the runway and won't easily assimilate a visual message warning.
As a matter of fact, the idea that appeals to me the most is - sorry, that very good post was totally lost in the A vs B war - to modify the *RETARD* logic, first by letting it sound until all T/Ls are in IDLE, but also to insist on the identification : In this accident, the warning could have been :
" RETARD...RETARD...RETARD...RETARD
TWO...RETARD
TWO............". The urgency addition to a famliar aural cue would be picked a lot more easily and the cure immediate .
(About the Bielefeld University paper...)
I have the deepest respect for
Pr Ladkin's and his team's work and that paper is impressive enough but it is totally non-exploitable for a pilot in it's state.
I could take the last diagram and understand the working of the system. But then - because I'm a pilot and not a scientist - I would need to break it down into some simple, digestible and usable pieces. That's what I posted yesterday and I bet my bottom Euro that ALL the pilots have a similar sum-up of the system in the back of their minds.
You can check my sum-up and I bet a dinner at Vatel's that it's valid against Pr L's diagram .
Regards