So the only question that rest unanswered is: Why did CM1 leave the TL in climb detend?
I disagree.
The main question is:
Given that it is possible to set the TLs this way either consciously or inadvertently, what more are Airbus and operators doing about it right now?
I am amazed with a month almost passed since this accident, and with a great deal of information apparently comfortably understood to the extent that there is no real mystery, just time-consuming analysis to do, that we haven't now seen more action. We can't (yet) change the firmware in the average pilot brain, yet the way that works or doesn't sometimes seems to be the convenient conclusion for many here.
Airbus pilots seem to be some of the first now to argue that all analysis so far seems to confirm what happened was per the design specification (assuming if it was as documented) and is as expected from the pilot actions.
Indeed one has even said that he/she has learned/reinforced what they need to do now from careful reading of this forum!!! A kind of unwritten PPRuNe derived SOP perhaps
. Soon to be 100 pages long at that!
Surely not?
This isn't one of those "we'll never really know" / never found the box / wreckage not recovered / nothing to learn until the final report type accidents, is it?
Yet I have heard of no temporary groundings, no AD that urgently audits all the airframes to check that all software/firmware is standard and as documented or one that calls for immediately retraining the wetware to corresponding standards. I can only assume that the "bet your life on it money" has said it can wait. (Note "your life" not theirs - theirs is the money!)
Good read that it is, this thread is becoming like War and peace. Sadly the borderline between War and peace ops gets blurred more every day.