I wish to disagree with Sarah737 that the chain of events started at 20 feet. That may be the case in the event of a "slip" failure in only grabbing a single one of the pair of Thrust Levers, if the pilot flying's intention was to move both to Idle. In the event of a rule based or knowledge based mistake, you have to go much further back into design philosophy, pilot knowledge-training-experience, procedures, checklists, briefings etc.
ICAO Annex 14 2.9.5 requires the aerodrome to publish a NOTAM or inform the pilots via AIP AD2 or ATC that the runway is "slippery when wet". The braking friction testing carried out by the airport operator did not show this characteristic under test conditions. There were no braking action tests reported as being carried out prior to the TAM landing accident.
Attachment A7 gives further details of slippery when wet.
Annex 15 Appendix 1 in the listing of AIP contents, shows that AD 1.1 sub-para 5 is the place where the State is required to publish "
friction measuring device used and the runway friction level below which the State will declare the runway to be slippery when wet;".
Does anybody have a copy of AD 1.1 for Brazil to see what values are published by the State?
As for PJ2's comments in relation to touchdown point, you can work it out fairly accurately if you have enough engineering skill and know enough about how the data were collected.
If the earlier reports of 11 seconds to brake application are correct, then this would indicate a distance of approximately 1000 metres down the runway. This gave approximately 10 seconds on the runway and then the 4.5 seconds off the runway prior to going through the taxiway retaining wall.
Is anybody going to do the 1.20 EPR calculation to work out the forward thrust contribution and compare it with the expected "ground" idle?