Regarding the state of the runway/airfield, I feel any blame should lie with the apparent lack of dissemination of information. Whether or not the 'slippery' nature of a wet 35L WAS known to airlines we do not seem to have established. I would argue that responsibility for whether or not and how you operate into such an airport should be left with the airline and ultimately the Captain. Given knowledge of the apparent condition of a wet 35L I would have hoped that landing weight/crosswind limitations would have been imposed, along perhaps with additional MEL restrictions, and given this 'odd' phenomonen of what appears to be the occasional incorrect AB throttle handling technique (reverser out) I would have expected this to have been highlighted well before through the safety process, especially where the apparent result of such mishandling can be so catastrophic. Having an engine run to 'Climb' power during landing is going to cause tears, even on a long dry runway.
It would seem that there is a gap to be filled in teaching AB handling. As with any new system, especially a software driven one, 'bugs' are found and need to be dealt with, either by modification or by crew training as happened with the early AB accidents, when the learning curve was very steep. As 'dreamland' says in #534, maybe we have now reached that stage?