Grauniad:
A whiff of corruption
As if they don't have enough trouble at sea, BAE and the Royal Navy are at the heart of one of the biggest standoffs for years in defence policy. The future of the government's defence policy, and defence industrial strategy, could hang on the plan to build two big aircraft carriers - a project eminent critics now say will cost more than replacing Trident.
The navy says it needs the carriers to remain credible, and viable, as a fighting service. BAE says the carrier contract, like that for the new generation Trident submarines, is vital if they are to stay in the naval construction business, worth tens of thousands of jobs in the UK. If they don't get this kind of work, they'll take their bat and ball, and set up as a primarily US-based company. Such threats have done them well in the past, giving them a virtual monopoly in large areas of defence procurement for the UK forces. The news that the US has lodged a serious diplomatic protest about the blocking of the fraud enquiry into BAE's deal for Typhoon aircraft with the Saudis makes the threat to quit UK shores look pretty hollow.
Just before Easter, the government was set to place the main construction contract for two 60,000-tonne fleet aircraft carriers for the navy at an estimated cost of about £3.6bn. According to critics, like the former head of the Ministry of Defence, Sir Michael Quinlan, this would not even be half the bill. He estimates that the carrier programme as currently envisaged would cost more than the project to replace the Trident missile system - missiles, submarines, bases and all. Trident replacement, according to the government's own white paper published before Christmas, would cost between £20bn and £25bn. Critics, some recently retired from the MoD's procurement and logistics wings, believe that the estimate by Greenpeace that Trident replacement, taking everything into consideration like bases, updates, maintenance and refits, would cost something like £76bn over a 30-year lifespan, is much nearer the mark.
Critics of the carrier project as currently conceived come from within the Royal Navy, past and present, as well as specialists like Sir Michael Quinlan. Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward, who commanded the Falklands task force in 1982, thinks they are too big and too difficult to manage by the navy and air force at their present size. He would like to see the navy order three smaller carriers, slightly larger than the present Invincible class. These would be able to launch new jump-jet fighter-bombers to protect the fleet and any amphibious force it lands. Sir Michael Quinlan is concerned about the almost total absence of any public discussion on the project, which could become a huge white elephant (my words, not his) particularly if current projects such as the Type 45 air defence destroyer, at £600m a time, are anything to go by.
The plan for the navy to get two big carriers was first made public in the Strategic Defence Review of 1998. The carriers were needed, the review argued, for Britain to be able to mount "expeditionary missions" for the modern age. Since then, the argument has been reinforced by notions that local powers will be increasingly reluctant to give bases to British and allied forces and not permission to overfly. So the expeditionary force has to be launched and supplied from the sea. This is fine in theory, but there are questions about human and fiscal resources to do the job properly. Some argue the navy is too small to be able to provide sea and air crew for such large ships, which will each require a complement of about 3,000 at least, plus shore teams and replacements.
The biggest difficulty is the aircraft. The new carriers are designed to fly the American Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The bill for this aircraft already stands at about $260bn, and it is going north steadily - so much so that there are growing doubts in sections of the Pentagon that even the US can afford the programme. The conundrum is that the aircraft carrier is built round the plane, and not the other way around; and to date, there is no credible alternative to the F-35 JSF. Britain is due to get between 120 and 150 of the new aircraft, to be flown jointly by the navy and the RAF. This is in addition to the 232 Eurofighter Typhoons currently being delivered to the RAF. The problem is that, today, there only enough crew to fly 90 combat planes by the UK forces.
The third unknown is what is termed "combat systems" - the computers, radars, communications architecture, airborne early warning, special jamming aircraft and drones. These, in the main, have not even been designed, let alone costed, and they will amount to more than the £3.6 to £4bn for the hulls. Totting up the cost of the combat systems, the aircraft, the building of the hulls, the maintenance facilities, and the need for at least half a dozen major refits in a 40-year lifespan, you can see how Sir Michael Quinlan has come to his calculation that the carrier programme is likely to cost more than the replacement of Trident.
The new carriers, CVF, already named as HMS Queen Elizabeth II and HMS The Prince of Wales, are to be the keystone of the Defence Industrial Strategy designed by the minister for defence procurement, Lord Drayson. He wants to base his strategy on long-term partnerships with key contractors like BAE, Thales UK, and Finmeccanica, now a major player through Agusta Westland, and the former GEC Marconi companies. Some fear this could hand an unhealthy monopoly to big players like BAE in sectors like submarines. Lord Drayson wants to streamline the naval yards, which suffer from over-capacity, and wants most of the seven to merge. Vosper Thorneycroft says it will only get into bed with BAE if the carrier deal is guaranteed. Drayson says he wants to see the marriage first.
Meanwhile, there is the question of money, and where it comes from. The problem with the Strategic Defence Review of '98 is that it was never properly costed. Gordon Brown has told the defence ministers, according to industry sources, that they can have the carriers, but provided the money comes from within the defence funding laid out in the Comprehensive Spending Review due to be announced later this summer. The MoD says that this cannot be done unless other programmes are cut or halved, such as the one to replace the army's ancient vehicles now being beaten up in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Some old salts fear that the carriers have such a strong whiff of the Blair era of expeditionary adventures - and that they will be cancelled as soon as Chancellor Brown shifts residence from No11 to No 10. However, much of the building work will be done in Scotland, on the Clyde and at Rosyth, hard by the constituencies of Mr Brown and defence secretary Des Browne.
There is a good case for the fleet having modern, adaptable, medium-sized carriers, like the US Marines amphibious carriers. They are needed to land and protect amphibious forces and keep sea lanes open - but not to launch highly sophisticated fighter-bombers to attack distant capitals. The contradiction at the heart of the present project for 60,000-tonne fleet carriers is its odd mixture of megalomania and desperation. To the eye, it looks like another great defence white elephant is about to be launched, to join the herd with the Eurofighter and the Daring class Type 45 destroyers. To the nose, it has a slight, but distinct aroma of two large grey pork barrels.