Airspace Reform – Quiet Reflection
AIRSPACE REFORM – QUIET REFLECTION
It was predictable, though by no means certain, that the current planned airspace reform program would stall at this point, because of serious flaws in process and planning. It should not, however, be seen as a “right or wrong” situation – merely one where decisions were (finally) taken on the ultimate aviation fallback – SAFETY.
We are sure that there was inordinate pressure being brought to bear on the decision makers. Common sense has prevailed.
We have observed two things in this debate. The first is a dramatic polarization of views in Australian aviation, with a hard “in favour of NAS” faction, and a hard “against NAS” faction, and very little observable middle ground.
The more important observation, though, has been the tremendous, albeit last minute, focus on risk assessment and cost benefit analysis. These were the tools missing at the start of this reform effort, and if nothing else positive has come of the exercise, it is the presence of a range of tools and expertise with which to attack any future reform efforts.
It is impossible that a sensible debate could be had now, or in the very near future. But rather than engage in a drawn out blame shift or legal battle, Mr Smith could and should add significantly to airspace management be asking his experts to cooperate and collaborate with Airservices Australia and other industry partners to develop a common and agreed risk modeling process, that is acceptable to all parties. This would include the work done by other stakeholders, including Broome airport.
One thing that is patently clear is the contribution to the recent chaos caused by the failure of your regulator to make a decision and publish a risk reference standard for Australia. The only material in the public domain is outdated guidance material, which causes more harm that good.
One of the first objectives of your regulator must be to “bite the bullet” and declare what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable risk in Australian aviation. At the very least, it will give you a start point from which to argue safety and risk in the public domain.
Once more we have to say that the proposed changes under NAS were not necessarily unsafe – but the manner in which they were being introduced, and the total lack of transparent process, made the transition risk unacceptable. If further reform is to be achieved, not only must the risk associated with the changes be examined, but those associated with implementing the changes must be examined and carefully managed.
The nature of airspace, and the evolution of aircraft and supporting infrastructure, is such that airspace review and reform must be a constant process. Airspace is a national commodity, which must be used in the national interest, and not unnecessarily restricted for the benefit of one part of the aviation industry. This must be achieved within an agreed safety and risk management framework.