Shy Torque
<<Thanks for the potted explanation of TANS...>>
I was pointing out that the inaccuracy of TANS and of the particular relevence that this crew were aware of this (warning others in the Flight) and would not have been relying upon it for a close in turn - they had already passed the point at which TANS indicated they should turn - they had no radar - they were relying on their eyes or something else to continue closer.
<<There is no suggestion that a usable DME beacon was available ...>>
The TACAN CU was set to work on the MAC beacon (TACAN or DME) but I agree that they would not have had LOS which means probably no workable signal - although at such short range to it it was worth asking pilots who had done this run at this altitude whether this was the case. The simple answer is for someone ask the RAF if they had something there AT THE TIME - it would have been such a useful facility, one would have thought - this is why I am pushing away on this thread in the hope that someone may pick this one up and answer it definitively - why bother to just criticise when it would be less effort to help clear this up?
<<Regarding the speed question, the Boeing simulation was just that, based on a simple time/distance calculation on other estimates. No way can this be held up as substantiated evidence. It could be argued that it was in the aircraft manufacturer's interest to offer up nothing other than a continued high speed for the whole crossing. >>
I refer readers to the document:
8-7D20-DS S-03 06, Enclosure 4
Dated: June 18,2002
Mull of Kintyre -Analysis of Available Data
Prepared by
James Mitchell
Technical Fellow
The Boeing Company
(available on the internet)
I think that you would agree that this was a decent effort to reconstructing the flight in the absence of any other objective detailed work available. If correct, it does suggest that the a/c cruised along until its last moment evasive manouevre suggesting that the pilots had misjudged their proximity to the landmass. At any rate, it is a very worthwhile read for everyone interested in this crash.
<<I cannot readily believe that a crew, especially one of their calibre, did not do the one thing that is second nature to all SH pilots. If you aren't sure if you can maintain visual flight you slow down.>>
Because they were in clear air and would remain so if they made the small left turn in time - they could see the Mull and would have been able to avoid it easily if they wanted to give it a wide berth and stay out to sea - their difficulty would have been if they wanted to come in close (for whatever reason, and I can think of a very good one) as I know helicopters did at this location even in these all too common conditions (as I was told by the lighthousekeeper and as I witnessed myself on one occassion). It was not that they were in cloud but that the land ahead was shrouded in a ground hugging mist (formed locally as the air rose up the slope - very common there) - given that they were approaching the Mull just about end-on, they would not have had any adjacent topographical features to give a spatial awareness. It is my hypothesis that such an experienced and capable crew would not have come in closer, at the speed that there were travelling at, than the TANS waypoint with such a bad visual reference ahead without having had something else to go on. If those interested plot the position at which the crew updated/changed waypoints on the TANS they may agree that this was already rather too close to carry on relying on eyeball alone - yet there could not have been a control problem at this point, one would have thought, or they would surely not have bothered with the en route nav.
<<The only real evidence was given by the yachtsman in a statement and he said the aircraft was going slowly during the time he saw it.>>
and the first time I saw a jumbo jet I thought it was going so slow that it was going to fall out of the sky - because it was an unfamiliar size/shape with nothing near it to give perspective ... a bit like a mist shrouded headland really.
<<Sorry to be the one to say it, but I don't really think that trying to invent new theories provides much value at this late stage, especially ones involving US Navy Seals searching for special equipment, second Chinooks in the area etc.>>
Actually, this theory goes back to week 1 at which point I started trying to get the authorities to check this possibilty out as, however unlikely etc etc , evidence of tampering with the ground equipment may have been destroyed say with the next maintenance visit - that was the urgency in pushing out this view before the inquiries etc - please understand that, at that time, I naturally assumed that DME would have been used for this leg - an obvious choice, in my opinion - and I had not at that time knowledge of the relative positions of Beacon site and a/c. With regard to the SEALS bit, your spin seems to be aimed at suggesting some conspiracy theory angle, but they were there - should we ignore that fact so as to sound nice and conservative? The second Chinook bit was sent in initially by another subscriber to this site - take that up with him, if you please.
I persist with this line simply because this line of thought has not been properly explored - think about it, 10 yrs after an a/c flies into hill on a regular route and the flight plan and practice for this leg are still not clear. Further, as time passed and details of the inquiries were published, I began to feel that the authorities did not want to contemplate such a possibilty. Whether this is the case or not, I believe that the actual practice of crews making that (regular) crossing at that time should have been made available to those inquiries, in the interests of saving time at those inquiries at least - if you look through the transcripts with the flight plan in mind I think that you will find nothing but obfuscation and misleading waffle from the RAF on this (surely) most basic starting point for understanding such a crash.
<<P.S. I think that Mr. Malik's article has it all just about spot on.>>
In many respects I agree, a powerful article - but of particular relevence to some points I have been trying to make is this paragraph:
<<It was more than a tragedy; it was a disgrace. If you wish to plan an aircraft accident, you would be well advised to select a new aircraft of doubtful reliability, with which the pilots are unfamiliar and nervous, choose a day of poor visibility, select a route through mountains too high for the aircraft to fly over, select a cliff-face as the first turning-point, omit to plan elementary emergency procedures, dispatch the aircraft without a review of its flight plan, and then for good measure put 25 of the most gallant and important people available on the one aircraft. >>
Funny how 10 years on the core of such significant text can have such misconceptions in it (no disrespect to Mr Malik, anyone trying to follow this case could do the same, which is a key problem in this tragic case) like "... choose a day of poor visibility, select a route through mountains too high for the aircraft to fly over, select a cliff-face as the first turning-point, ...". I think that followers of this thread can now see that: visbilty over the sea at low level was good; the route was not over mountains but up the coast; and that turning point, well, that is all that is left - well done Mr. Malik, you have managed to get a wide audience to focus on it - the turn was the crux - and as Mr Malik so rightly implies, it was selected at the planning stage - not a whim of foolhardy cowboys - were they pressured into flying close in for whatever reason (eg operational, masking their approach) or was there a local aid to assist pilots on this regular route at this one awkward point in an otherwise walk-in-the-park VFR flight?