This new report is extremely flawed. It is more likely that they have started with a pre-conceived pilot hijacking scenario and tried to bash this evidence into the hole.
Maybe they should look at the evidence first and then arrive at the most likely scenario and endpoint.
Prior to departure the oxygen bottle was serviced by Malaysia.
There wasn’t any change in behaviour as the crew passed through security. They are observed smoking prior to departure.
The aircraft departed KL and climbed to FL350/Mach 0.82
During the turn at IGARI, the transponder ceased transmission.
Aircraft turns back at about 25 degrees angle of bank, descends to FL340 and accelerates to Mach 0.84, flies in heading mode or manually until south of Penang.
Observed on primary radar by multiple Malaysian and Thai radar sites. Inherent errors in primary radar displays incorrect and unrealistic altitude changes.
No ACARS received, no comms received. No SATCOM log off.
Manually deleting the Flight ID would record a SATCOM log off.
FO cell phone connects to a cell tower when aircraft south of Penang at 1752:27.
Aircraft diverts to VAMPI-MEKAR-NILAM in LNAV still at Mach 0.84/FL340.
SATCOM call made TO aircraft via Indian Ocean satellite but can’t connect via the aircraft’s left High Gain Antenna at 18:03.
At 1822:12, the aircraft is 10 NM NW of MEKAR and leaves Malaysian primary radar range.
All Indonesian primary radar recordings at Lhokseumawe, Medan, Sabang and Sibolga are not available!
At 1825:27, aircraft initiates a SATCOM logon request to Indian Ocean Satellite. No Flight ID received from aircraft.
Aircraft must be heading south by 1840 to comply with satellite BTO / BFO data.
SATCOM call made TO aircraft at 1840, it connects but is not answered.
Approximately every hour, the satellite confirms that the aircraft is still on line, this timing can determine the aircraft’s distance (the 7 arcs) from the satellite.
Seven hours after the disappearance, the aircraft initiates a SATCOM log on. Again there isn’t a flight ID, and the aircraft is descending between 5000 to 15000 feet per minute.
Around 36 pieces of debris have been found from just about every part of the plane.
Debris barnacle analysis finds optimum sea temperature range for barnacle growth between 18-24C.
Debris drift analysis finds locations south of Latitude 40S and north of Latitude 20S unlikely.
Confirmed debris analysed by the ATSB confirms flaps where not deployed at the end of flight.
Now for the most likely scenario and endpoint.
The topped up crew oxygen bottle ruptured due to poor maintenance practices by Malaysia. (Soap and water for leak detection tests!)
The adjacent P105 Left Wire Integration Panel and Left AIMS Cabinet is obliterated.
The crew are overwhelmed and bombarded with left systems failures, ie no left transponder, no left FMC, no left HGA, no left Autothrottle, DU failures, no AMU, no ACARS, etc
The crew divert to the nearest suitable airport (Penang) at the default LRC speed of M0.84 and appropriate altitude.
They start to run checklists and problem solve.
FO turns on cell phone to call for help.
Approaching Penang, they manually switch to the right FMC, the software reset deletes the Flight ID.
Without the valid landing altitude data, the cabin altitude warning message shows at 15,000 feet, not 10,000 feet. And unfortunately for the crew, they have missed the gradual decompression event and start to become hypoxic (earlier for smokers). Mentally confused they program a diversion to Banda Aceh airport via NILAM and SANOB.
They eventually succumbed to hypoxia and pass out.
A flight attendant on portable oxygen attempts to revive the pilots, but can’t. The oxygen masks for the pilots are connected to… the ruptured oxygen bottle!
All occupants peacefully pass out from hypoxia.
The aircraft continues on autopilot. At Top Of Descent to Banda Aceh, the serviceable right Autothrottle slows the aircraft to the descent speed, the inop left throttle remains at the high power setting for Mach 0.84
As the aircraft turns left at NILAM towards SANOB, the aircraft switches from the failed left high gain antenna to the serviceable right high gain antenna, mounted on the right side of the aircraft, since the satellite is now on the right side of the aircraft (direction to satellite is about 262 degrees true). The aircraft can finally initiate a renewed log on with all occupants deceased (arc 1). The aircraft overflies Banda Aceh heading south, where it reverts to heading MAGNETIC at the end of route. (Note Indonesia is not releasing primary radar data)
The aircraft passes all arcs on time, meets BFO data, meets actual wind/temperature recordings, meets fuel exhaustion precisely, communicates with the satellite via the right HGA, conforms with autopilot constraints, meets barnacle analysis, meets drift analysis, and meets debris damage observed.
Where the ATSB search went wrong was they kept pushing the pilot suicide constant speed/switch to constant true heading solution, because a constant speed/constant magnetic heading overshoots arc 6 and 7 due to the changing magnetic variation in the southern Indian Ocean.
BUT… if you consider the accident scenario (oxygen bottle rupture) with the crew trying to save the plane, then due to the massive thrust lever differential at top of descent to Banda Aceh, the left engine runs out of fuel up to an HOUR earlier than the right! Due to envelope protection features, the slower single engine speed during the last hour now causes the aircraft to crash at the seventh arc at around 34 South 93 East, when the right engine flames out and autopilot disengages.
Auto engine restart momentarily powers SATCOM causing log on (arc 7).
The aircraft hits the water at high velocity and out of control.
The ATSB only searched about 2NM inside the arc at 34S 93E, because it concentrated the search at 38 South 88 East out to 40 NM wide.