Let's be the Devil's advocate again. MCAS is starting to be described as a kind of intermittent electric Stick Pusher. The high rate gives this impression.
To use the existing STS system to motor the nose down to keep stick loads within certification boundaries, and do it gently, seems fairly logical. But just supposing that added algorithm hadn't been given the grand name of MCAS! It's no longer a thing, just more processing. It's possible no one would have ever known something new was involved, given the existing chaos.
However, Boeing did give the game away. In the midst of the crash threads, I spotted mention of MCAS in a South American airline's Pilot's Handbook. Just a few lines. It was possibly the only such mention in the World.
I think it's important to go back to focussing on the single AoA sensor that should have been listed in the "Catastrophic" catagory, and hopefully required duplication. The history of that refurbished or older part is pivotal in the Lion Air disaster . . . and perhaps, Boeing.
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. . . they were removing the ability to isolate MCAS/STS/autopilot inputs but still leave the Elec trim active.
Was there a pre-MAX 737 that like the MAX, had only ONE three-phase motor in the tail? What I'm getting at is - did the change to the cutout switches' wiring, coincide with the introduction of the two clutches that selected mechanical power from the single electric motor for the jack screw? (AP and Pickle Switches?)