Perhaps you need to read the Ethiopian report that details the answers Boeing supplied to Ethiopian pilots.
I don't fault the pilots specifically. The airline had the obligation to ensure they were properly trained and the Ethiopian CAA had the obligation to see the training was correct and correctly done. Given both pilots mishandled the stick shaker, it's clear their training was inadequate.
Part of Boeing's response to questions from the Ethiopian pilots:
The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other Airplane systems.
They were not in a frame of mind to understand that the Lion Air crash was initiated by bringing the flaps-up during a stick shaker event, even though Boeing underlined "flaps up flight" in their response. Had they cut the autothrottle, used pitch and power, and not changed the flap configuration, the situation would have been an annoyance. We won't know why the Chief Pilot and CAA did not take measures to ensure they would be in the correct frame of mind.
The key is that I agree it should not be up to pilots. It should be up to their management and their CAA to ensure that if there is a known defect in the airplane that either the plane is pulled from service or the pilots are well rehearsed in managing when the defect rears its ugly head. This already applies to a large number of "fly with a defect":items.