It was Treasury pressure to address the variability of the annual spend on flying training which compelled the MOD to contract it out. MFTS as contracted was certainly steady and predictable, but ignored the fact that the variability of the spend reflected the variability of the throughput requirement as outflow rates, organisational changes and defence review decisions on front line numbers worked their way through the system. Guess what, those things are still unpredictable (COVID and its effect on inflow/outflow numbers being just one example of a surprise factor).
I wonder if any consultant would have the courage to recommend terminating MFTS, bringing aircrew pipeline management back fully in house where it belongs, and accepting that the system should be sized to allow ups and downs in demand? Training its front line aircrew is part of the core business of an air force; international students should be used as backfill during periods of low domestic demand rather than being the priority output (as might appear to be the case right now).