Good lobbying - Ethiopia or AMS - would not be detectable.(Nobbling the jury ?)
There are similarities between the Max and AMS, particularly in the Boeing stance that the pilots should have seen, understood, and managed the situation.
Decker provides a good overview of the human factors aspects at AMS, prepared for the Dutch Investigators;
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/nl/med...t_s_dekker.pdf
Change the Flight No and highlight 737 Max, then the conclusions could be the same.
"The only defence agains a designed-in single-failure path are the pilots who are warned to mistrust their machine and to stare at it harder.
For flight crews of Boeing 737’s, like the crew of TK1951, there is no sufficient training, no written guidance or documentation, and no likelihood of line experience that would insulate them from the kind of automation surprise that happened …"
Also, in one of the Annexes to the AMS Investigation Report there is a good argument with simulator tests that Boeing's assumptions on system setup and use, and their piloted simulation (CAB) of the detection, understanding and action for pull-up during an AMS type malfunction, was an unrealistic view of human performance for certification - and not trained for.
Apparently the FAA did not respond to this aspect - why, … too difficult, we accepted thus believe Boeings view (self certification), and it (737) has been safe enough so far (but Boeing did modify some FGS aspects which would have disconnected the AP).
Other views:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail