De-skilling is a creeping malaise in both engineering and piloting. The less you have to train someone, the less you have to pay them. You could call it the ISO9000 disease. You give an idiot a written procedure that he may never deviate from and you can pay that idiot as little as you like because the job requires no skill. The fewer LAEs you employ, the cheaper your operation. With the reduced number of LAEs those that remain come under intolerable pressure of work and naturally start to make mistakes. Incorporate a 'Murphy' element in the NLG hinge mechanism then you have the required recipe for disaster.
Interesting AAIB comment that the SB for modifying the 'Murphy' NLG to remove the possibility for confusion was 'prioritised' to some undetermined date in the future.... What does that tell you about the World's Favourite Airline?
When the UK was in the EU British registered aircraft eventually fell under the governance of EASA. The UK CAA were not slow to capitalise on that situation and promptly made redundant all those CAA personnel previously responsible for safety oversight. Unfortunately after Brexit those personnel have not been replaced. Instead the CAA relies heavily on individual airlines carrying out their own oversight via approved safety management systems. In one particular airline ASRs routinely go uninvestigated unless AAIB participation is expected. The net result is that pilots don't bother to file ASRs any more. There is a huge difference between 'monitoring for trends' and simply kicking dangerous issues into the long grass.
With airlines now 'self-investigating' incidents we are quickly moving towards the situation experienced in the US where the FAA relaxed governance over Boeing which allowed the 'self-certification' of the 737 Max. As we know that did not end well.