I posted this in the Tiger MkIII thread, but this article provides a rather interesting insight into the relationship between the French Government, Airbus, and their Customers and or partners. It is equally relevant here.
Tiger Mark 3: it's decision time for Germany
https://www.latribune.fr/entreprises...rs-905626.html
The Berlin Air Show (ILA) will give indications on German orientations in terms of cooperation with France and Europe. Germany will have to say whether or not it remains in the Tiger Mark 3 program
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The signals from Germany "are not positive at the operational level and at the Ministry of Defense in relation to the priority which would be given to the Tiger Mark 3" underlined the CEO of Airbus Helicopters, Bruno Even. (Credits: Airbus Helicopters)There is no longer any doubt that Germany should announce shortly - possibly at the ILA air show in Berlin - that it will not participate in the modernization program of the Tiger combat helicopter by upgrading its aircraft to standard 3 under prime contractor Airbus Helicopters. Once again Berlin proves to be an unreliable partner for France in terms of European cooperation in the field of armaments. The list is long, too long of German renunciations on programs in cooperation with France launched in July 2017: armament of the Tiger (MAST-F missile now Akeron-LP), program of maritime patrol aircraft MAWS (Berlin ordered P-8A Poseidons from Boeing) and, finally, most certainly the Tiger Mark 3.
If Germany confirmed the decision to release the Tiger Mark 3, it would cause a new legitimate frustration in Paris and above all would not generate confidence in France while the latter has privileged Berlin as a major partner in the field of defense. Finally, France would take a new slap in the face, especially since Emmanuel Macron has invested a lot in bringing out and launching all these cooperations. The next speeches by Sébastien Lecornu, the new Minister of the Armed Forces very close to the President, will therefore be scrutinized in the light of German decisions.
Tiger Mark 3 is not Berlin's priority
The Germans have until around the end of June to communicate to France and Spain their decision to remain in this program. At the Paris Forum held in early June, Airbus Helicopters CEO Bruno Even seemed pessimistic about Germany's participation in this program. Asked if he had had any positive signals from Germany, he replied that "They are not positive at the operational level and at the Ministry of Defense in relation to the priority, which would be given to the Tiger Mark 3". “Nevertheless, I consider that everything is possible because the decision on this type of program is political,” he added cautiously, leaving the door open to German politicians. At the ILA show, the Germans should confirm that they are staying at the dock.
Bruno Even does not "believe in an American option", which is "unrealistic". The whole question is whether Berlin will offer compensation to Airbus Helicopters, naturally favoring the German factories of the manufacturer. Beyond the maintenance and treatment of obsolescence of the current German Tiger, which has not been called into question, will Berlin acquire lighter combat aircraft of the H145 type, or even H135s, from Airbus? Helicopters? It would seem logical. Finally, the skills of Donauwörth will be used within the framework of the Tiger Mk3, independently of the arrival of Germany on this program.
The differences between Paris and Berlin
Between France and Germany, "we have a fundamental subject, which will not necessarily be reduced given the additional means that the Germans will invest in their defense", it was estimated not long ago that Paris. Crucial differences. In France, the armed forces express operational needs, which manufacturers strive to meet. "In Germany, things don't work that way. Defense manufacturers produce defense equipment and the armies buy it or not", we explain to the Tribune. Thus, as soon as Berlin announced the defense fund of 100 billion euros, German industrialists presented their invoice to the German authorities, including one that could supply up to 42 billion euros in military equipment.
In addition, "there is not the equivalent of a DGA in Germany. This creates a difficulty for us French. The lack of symmetry means that we sometimes have difficulty finding interlocutors, identifying them and identify the places of decision-making. It's not easy", we explain in Paris.
Finally, the German government is very sensitive to the concerns of German industrialists. "Seen from France, it is difficult to understand that when an industrialist is reluctant, the German government cannot orient, incite, convince, persuade certain industrialists that it is important to see the problem differently, and therefore to try to provide a solution", we explain in Paris. This is the case with the MGCS program (tank of the future) blocked by Rheinmetall and the SCAF (Future air combat system), blocked by Airbus (phase 1B). This point "shows a significant difference between France and Germany". In the end, Franco-German cooperation is very complicated to launch. Especially since we must add the problems of coalitions, the relations between the Chancellery and the Bundestag, the German institutional rules...