Originally Posted by
alf5071h
vilas,
First how can you explain knowledge of the extent or quality of the crews ‘ignorance’.
Unlikely, pure speculation based on your assessment of the event with hindsight. False reasoning from the outcome, backward to deduce cause … Not so.
How many similar events have been encountered without a problem.
Second, how can you know the quality of the crews instrument scan; presuming that you were not there nor have discussed the issue with the crew.
Hindsight bias;
https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/hindsight-bias
Individual effects -
… If we look back at past decisions and conclude that their consequences were indeed known to us at the time (when they weren’t), then it makes sense that we will overestimate our ability to foresee the implications of our future decisions. This can be dangerous, as our overconfidence may lead us to take unnecessary risks. …
Also see the related biases:
Regret Aversion,
Cognitive Dissonance,
Dunning–Kruger Effect
Look if you make an approach without looking at your speed till you crash it's poor flying. It's poor scan. Period. No fancy theories are required. FIrst pilot of Boeing should know the intricacies of THR HOLD. There's a problem in SFO report NTSB asked Boeing to look at it. However it's a case of thrust not moving to maintain speed notwithstanding why. So if the pilot has the scan he will notice and move the thrust himself. Providing fancy human factors for poor flying is the reason for more and more automation. Finally it will take the pilot out.