It has been a while since I last flew the 737, but during more than a decade as a captain on type I found the 737 Technical Website an interesting source of information. The bit about runaway stabilizer reminded me of some of the details
737 Runaway Stabilizer Procedure. I watched the Netflix documentary last night and then refreshed my memory on a couple of things. A number of well qualified contributors have emphasised that if the crews had only reacted quicker with the stab trim cutoff switches everything would have been fine and indeed that this was a memory item. The technical website documents that this was originally the case at least twenty plus years ago. But in the meantime Boeing has changed the QRH a number of times and more recently the first item on the drill was to hold the control column firmly. My memory of training was that pressure against the runaway should stop the trim running. If this did not work then you moved on to the cutoff switches. The idea of reaching for them like some Wild West gunslinger is certainly not what I remember. The conclusion from the investigation that you needed to react within ten seconds on the Max to prevent a catastrophe did not ever feature during training on the classic or NG. For economic reasons Boeing did not share any information about the MCAS out of concern that this would trigger a need for additional simulator training. This together with Boeing's change of company culture from one run by engineers to one focussed on Wall Street was I think persuasively argued by the programme and fits with comments made on this site by a number of well informed insiders.