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Old 10th Dec 2021, 14:11
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zero/zero
 
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Originally Posted by meleagertoo
Am I alone in becoming most uncomfortable at the ever-increasing tendency to blame the aircraft or manufacturer when pilots fail to manage long-established systems they are supposed to know and understand? Many aircraft have systems or procedures that may not appear to some to be logical or intuitive but are we not given specific training on how to operate these? Is this not why we are paid as pilots?

737 pilots are supposed to know their modes, selections and expected outcomes just as much as Airbus ones are; if a discontinued approach is managed in a different manner between the two is one of them wrong, or a 'worse' design? Why does one manufactureer 'need a complete clean sheet redesign' when it works just fine - as long as you use the right drills? There are even sniffy remarks above about the pitch-thrust couple in aircraft with underslung engines as though it is something so undesireable it needs designing out. (With what? Another MCAS type masking device? Is that really progress?). Is this really something that bothers modern pilots? If so it a very scary attitude, being phased by the simple inherentand benign charactersitics of your particular type. There seems to be an extraordinary mindset about nowadays that if something works less intuitively on one fleet than another then there is something wrong with the design. There's one helluva lot about Airbus that is very, very far from intuitive, and I'm not talking about the mangled and sometines incomprehensible language in the manuals.

If it takes 18 seconds to respond to an instruction to break off an approach in any type I respectfully suggest it isn't likely to be the aircraft or designer's fault. Had the crew been familiar with the correct procedure the manoeuvre would have started in maybe five seconds. The timescale implies they didn't. That is nothing to do with the manufacturer or the systems. It is an operator matter. What of it if the autopilot reverts temporarily to another mode? It presents no hazard, that's just the way the system works - but it does presuppose the pilots understand a) what is happeneing and b) what they are doing about it.

Boeing Bashing took on fever pitch over the MAX accidents which once again were caused in the immediate sense by just this, pliots who appeared lacking in their systems knowlege. It is all very well (and correct) to blame Boeing for providing the root of the problem but the nub of the matter durng the event was that both aircraft were perfectly flyable had the correct drills, not to mention the most basic of airmanship been applied. I can already hear the shrieks of fury at such herecy, but for all that it remains absolutely true.
Nonetheless, had the ABZ event ended in a smoking hole the Media and this forum too would, I assure you, be ablaze with the most wild and hysterical accusations of Corporate butchery and gross irresponsibility yada yada yada on Boeing's part for so misdesigning the autopilot (once again). That would neither be fair nor rational, but you can be assured it would have happned. But does the difference that no one was hurt make the design of an autopilot that has passed the rest of time reputation unsullied for decades suddenly a lethal trap? No it dosn't. So while not suggesting we ignore any shortcomings let's also not condemn something that actually works perfectly well as long as the operator understands it. Just like every other aspect of aviation you can think of.

I see this inclination to blame the designer as an extension of the Children of the Magenta Mind philosophy or mindset where pilots and commentators seem increasingly unable to deal with matters that the aircraft doesn't resolve or interpret itself, ie a reliance on pavlovian response to specific conditions/warnings without much if any analytical process to back things up where there isn't a Big Red Light that says "XYZ Failure" with the corresponding book-reference requiring "ABC" as response. ECAM is the ultimate example of a system that encourages this mindset, and indeed all but prevents independent action - that damn nearly caused the total loss of a 380 didn't it? Had that crew been merely pavlovian button-pushers they wouldn't have survived.

What we've lost here is something called "Airmanship" (anyone still remember Airmanship?). Knowing and understanding the how and why of your systems, not just which button to press. Knowing your drills and procedures. Thinking through all actions.
Noy relying in the damned autopilot to get you out of every pickle and blaming the manufacturer when it doesn't. We are clearly increasingly becoming reactive operators as oposed to proactive ones.

It isnt, imho, a healthy trend.
Oh brilliant, another “things were better in my day when we could fly manually fly a back beam NDB whilst inverted, without spilling the coffee”, neglecting to mention that there used to be a crash a month. Commercial aviation has moved on, the aircraft have got more advanced and the training and focus is different. It doesn’t mean the pilots are any worse, they’re just using a different skillset and like it or not, aviation is safer as a result. Yes of course you should fully understand the aircraft you’re flying and it’s very much possible to fly a safe G/A in a 737, in the same way that many people very successfully landed a DC-10… there are just gotchas to be aware of. A more modern aircraft such as the 787 would have made that whole scenario considerably easier.

As for the 18 seconds, as others have mentioned that’s not a sign of an incompetent crew… but more likely the conduct of a mini-brief/refresher of what was going to happen, which many training departments encourage if time allows and the ATC instruction isn’t for an immediate G/A.
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