One need simply to place the elevator tab to the takeoff position at the beginning of the pre-flight when you are doing the cockpit checks, and then observe its proper position when checking the elevator area.
When the tab travel limits are not the same (up vs down), the "takeoff position" is not necessarily in the middle, and the tab not necessarily trailing to the elevator at an indicated position. This was what I did not investigate enough during my control check. I did see the tab move in the correct direction, through what appeared to be the operating range. What I did not realize was that the long travel range of tab movement was on the side I did not need it.
The text of my original story about this:
A maintenance test flight was required, prior to the Transport Canada approved test flight for the evaluation of an external installation to the aircraft. I had flown this aircraft months earlier, for a very similar mod evaluation purpose, including spins and dives to 1.1 of Vne. Those flights were fine. It had not flown since, while it underwent inspection for a commercial C of A. This was the maintenance test flight following that inspection.
The aircraft is a Cessna U206F, with a Robertson STOL kit, and additional external equipment mounted. Following a review of the documents for the maintenance, a thorough preflight inspection, and normal start, I taxied out. Just before taking off, a final check of control freedom and direction, including the elevator trim tab – I have just read too many stories about flight control problems on test flights… Everything looked as it should from the pilot’s seat.
The aircraft was light weight at takeoff, and promptly leapt off the runway… Then immediately leapt more. A swift and large nose down control input seemed to help, but still it was heading for space! I confirmed that the pitch trim was set for takeoff (and it had been) then I rolled it all the way nose down. That helped a bit, but not really much.
By this point, landing back on the remaining runway was no longer an option. A circuit now lay ahead of me, which was going to be a muscle builder! I could lie on my back and hold my 30 pound daughter at arms length over me for a few minutes at a time. This flying was a lot more demanding than that! Flying with one hand so as retract flaps (very carefully) and adjust power, was manageable for only a few moments at a time. In downwind, I found that full flaps created the least uncomfortable configuration, probably simply because slower speed, less control force. I did not dare fly too slowly, being quite uncertain about how the aircraft would handle if stalled this way. During downwind, I was thinking about how I might jam my knee into the control wheel so as to relieve my tired arms – there really was no practical way..
Flaring for landing was an exercise in how to appropriately reduce the massive downforce I was applying to the controls. It worked. I taxied in, alternating thoughts of shock, and the old joke: I just flew in from – here! – and are my arms tired!” I also reminded myself how lucky I was there were no seats, occupants, or flight test ballast in the back for this first flight….
Knowing that I had had a serious pitch control problem, I asked for a check of the elevator and trim tab travels. The elevator was as it should be. The trim tab offered 3 degrees, where I would have expected to find five degrees according to the type certificate data sheet. I asked that the maximum travel in this direction be provided. I got 7 degrees. There was still a lack of certainty as to what the problem was, because I could not see how such a small travel limit error could produce such a dramatic effect. I invited the mechanic to join me in my next test flight. He reluctantly agreed, knowing that if he would not ride in it, why would I fly it. This time I was well prepared to abandon the takeoff, if things were not right. The takeoff was better, but the pitch control problem was still there. what had been a 40-50 pound push, was now 15-20. The mechanic now had no doubt that something had been very wrong on the first flight, as was still wrong now. I landed back.
After a rather puzzling review of the maintenance accomplished since my flight a few months earlier , the answer was found. The maintenance personnel had put a little too much thought into what they were doing…. The required maintenance had included the required overhaul of the trim actuator, thus it, and all the chain and cable, had been removed, and reinstalled. During the re-rigging, the technician had read the travel requirements for the tab in the maintenance manual. Instead of setting the tab for an up travel limit of 25 degrees, he set the travel to a “nose up” (tab down) limit of 25 degrees. This left the travel limit in the other direction of only 5 degrees, which I hereby attest is not anywhere close to the requirement!
By trying to “figure out” what the system required, the actual instruction was not followed as written. An unsafe condition was the result. The safety system further broke down, when the second signatory for the work accomplished did not detect the error. This was also a maintenance failing designed in by Cessna, as it was possible to mis-rig the system in the first place, and the manual did not give any warning to check for the mis-rigging.