Interesting slant on RCAF thinking by Dr. Richard Goette (who is an air power academic and Canadian Air Force historian. In the Department of Defence Studies at the CFC [Canadian Forces College] in Toronto, he lectures on command, air power and the RCAF. Richard also teaches CFC’s Joint Command and Staff Programme and National Security Programme and is a Master of Defence Studies supervisor.)
https://publications.gc.ca/collectio...0-2020-eng.pdf
However it was SEAD capability that took me there (though Gripen would offer the option of RBS-15 Mk IV anti ship missile if Canada wanted to introduce such a capability
):
For instance, suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) is an important prerequisite for a successful air campaign to ensure the safety of air crews and freedom of action for operations. Notably, in recent air campaigns SEAD is usually achieved before RCAF assets are employed either because a) there are minimal enemy air defences to begin with (i.e., in the case of Op IMPACT) or b) allied air forces have already suppressed most enemy air defences before the arrival of RCAF assets in theatre (i.e., Op MOBILE). Operating in an A2/AD campaign against integrated air defences in which SEAD efforts have not been completely successful and air superiority is still being contested offers a variety of challenges for the RCAF. For one, it would necessitate a robust defensive suite and/or low-observability capabilities for its platforms to shield them from threats. For another, it would also require capabilities to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum to protect RCAF forces and degrade those of the enemy.
If the Canadian government follows this thinking and believes it may deploy aircraft to operate in a contested airspace with (even partially) intact defences then I can't see how it can go with anything but F-35s.
(Thread Drift Follows)
It strikes me that UK thinking has long been the same in respect of SEAD, no sustained specialist SEAD platform, no ARM to replace ALARM (the deletion of the Typhoon ALARM requirement saved a staggering
£21 Million). If SPEAR(3)-EW does materialise it will be a persistent jamming platform, and any kinetic suppression will rely on allies or acurate target identification to use munitions which are not targeted on emissions. However effective Typhoon's DASS is, Germany still sees a need for a SEAD platform. The French (in public anyway) put great faith in Rafale's SPECTRA but as this RAND report (
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA200/RRA231-1/RAND_RRA231-1.pdf) points out their lack of SEAD capabilities severely constrains their freedom of action. I would have thought that one lesson of the Falklands War that is still relevant is, that in order to use your air assets to their maximum effectivity, you need to be able to locate and surgically remove the enemies ability to observe their movements. I have always assumed that LO will have a limited lifespan just like any other techological advantage in war fighting.