ROC man
When I saw the footage and read the report of the crash, my reaction was that the pilot was practising a “turn back”. This manoeuvre is questionable in its efficacy and carries a high risk; the aircraft is on the cusp of the stall throughout and, given the aerodynamics of the Hawk wing, once it goes wrong, there is no way out.
As Officer Commanding Flying at RAF Chivenor in 1992, I was involved in the board of inquiry into an identical accident in which a young weapons instructor student died because he, too, failed to eject – why we’ll never know.
The inquiry was thorough, but the outcome was clear: the aircraft stalled and recovery was impossible, given its height, so the crash was inevitable.
At the conclusion of the inquiry, I wrote that, given the risks, and as a turn back had never been done for real, I recommended that practising the manoeuvre be discontinued.
I was, however, overruled by the powers that be, who stated that “it was a good judgment exercise” and should remain in the syllabus.
Three months later, a Hawk was written off at Valley following a practice turn back, although both pilots walked away from it. Twenty-six years later, sadly, Corporal Bayliss lost his life, and it could have been avoided.
Wg Cdr Jeremy Parr RAF (retd)
Suckley, Worcestershire
I think that maybe Jerry is wrong?
My understanding is that the Practice Engine Failure was initiated with "apparently" enough height and speed to get to Low Key. Once the pilot had failed to achieve that Gate the Practice should have been "Knocked Off".
The poor decision to continue put the aircraft into a continually worsening situation. Even at half way round finals the aircraft could have been flown away quite safely.
The fact that the Hawk T1 does not had an AoA Gauge, Stall Warner or Command Eject Front to Rear only made the outcome more inevitable.