slacktide, thanks for reminding this SLF/atty that sometimes the legal stuff is worth the time it takes to read and consider what it means. (Also, I've often wondered just how different an "interview" by Congressional committee staff counsel is, compared to a deposition under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case in federal district court -- Answer: Very different (no objections, at least through the first 75 or so pages)).
This witness, following the Lion Air accident, was not part of the internal effort by Boeing to address what had happened. It is known, if the allegations in the Delaware derivative suit are even just mostly true and correct, that the corporate leadership decided to treat the accident as a routine, not extraordinary, event. So perhaps it is not striking, not unusual, that the chief project engineer would not have been in the loop. Nevertheless, part of defense counsel's task will be (IMHO) to ask, repeatedly and often, "what if?" Here, specifically, what if there were discussions at some approximately, or actually, senior levels about consulting Teal, and a decision was taken to leave him uninvolved? Why did the company do that?
Second, confronted with some rather obvious instances where design problems were revealed by accidents, the witness relies on, "we learn and evolve the process". Leave aside the escape from significant knowledge of the history of the DC-10, in the Turkish accident and then the American accident in Chicago - I realize counsel was trying to make a point and wanted to reach other examples (but this was artful dodging by the witness, and he got away with it). The "Special Conditions" (might not be exact terminology) for certification of the batteries on the 787, the subsequent grounding,... just, "we learn and evolve the process"? Well, maybe this is the Big Leagues today, and to wish for more dedication to right answers is naive. But if that is the case, then process has grown too large and all-powerful. The logical implication of this answer is to say that the 737 MAX accidents and what led up to them was just fine, because we can learn and change the process. In fact didn't the witness refuse to say that specific attributes of the MCAS were mistakes? - in what Process-Worshipping world is that an acceptable answer?
Third, without casting any criticisms at the attorneys who conducted the interview, it's too bad we (the flying public, the regulators, the pertinent Congressional committees, etc.) do not yet have a comprehensive and detailed timeline of how all of the relevant events and communications transpired. Example: this witness does not have knowledge about the interactions with Southwest leading up to the million-dollar contract provision. Well, somebody knows!! And would it not stand to reason that there are plenty of facts, lots of facts, about how that contract term eventuated, and how its pendency and move toward final agreement with the airline was communicated to senior levels? Senior levels who certainly knew something about MCAS and Level B and speed trim subroutine and flying or handling characteristics and the four-second reflex standard.
The more I read about the prosecution of the former chief technical pilot, the more unfair and politically motivated it seems. It may seem unrelated, but I lost count, in the first 75 or so pages, of how often Mr. Teal used the phrase "to be honest." A witness should not ever say that, for the obvious reason it can create impressions of less than honesty where it isn't recited. Then too, legal counsel for the witness are from a top-drawer firm, of course.